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CRIMINAL LAW
THE SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO
COUNSEL AND ITS UNDERLYING VALUES:




The Sixth Amendment has been described by leading
commentators as the central feature of our adversarial system,
nevertheless "scholars, lawyers, and judges have often lost their
way" in their attempts to understand the Amendment's scope
and underlying values.3 Such observations are particularly fit-
ting in the context of the right to counsel provision. A search of
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'The Sixth Amendment provides in full:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been com-
mitted, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to
have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of
Counsel for his defence.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI
2 See, e.g., Akhil R. Amar, Sixth Amendment First Principles, 84 GEO. LJ. 641, 641
(1996) ("The Sixth Amendment is the heartland of constitutional criminal proce-
dure.");JamesJ. Tomkovicz, The Massiah Right to Exclusion: Constitutional Prenises and
Doctrinal Implications, 67 N.C. L. REv. 751, 753 (1989) ("The sixth amendment right to
counsel is the central element of our adversary system.").
' SeeAmar, supra note 2.
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the scholarly literature reveals a variety of viewpoints regarding
the interests embraced by the Sixth Amendment's promise that
"[iln all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall ... have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defense."4 Moreover, the reported
cases bespeak a body of law lacking theoretical cohesion.5
This Article will examine the doctrinal confusion at the
heart of right to counseijurisprudence. The Article will identify
three values underlying the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel
Clause by examining several leading Supreme Court cases, pay-
ing particular attention to the possible role played by privacy
protection as a basis for the Court's decisions. The discussion
will then review lower court opinions and document the sub-
stantial disagreement by those courts as to the role of privacy
protection as a Sixth Amendment value. Building on an opin-
ion of Chief Judge Richard A. Posner of the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals, the Article will then derive principles recom-
mended as useful vehicles for defining the proper scope of
Sixth Amendment privacy. Those principles will then be ap-
plied to the relevant body of Supreme Court case law illustrating
that privacy protection is not a relevant value in those cases. Fi-
nally, the Article will urge judicial clarification of the function
of attorney-client privacy in right to counsel cases and offer the
principles herein as aids to that clarification.
' See supra note 1; infra Part V.B. In interpreting the Sixth Amendment, the Su-
preme Court has read the limitation to "criminal prosecutions" as generating a right
to counsel only "at or after the time that adversary judicial proceedings have been ini-
tiated." Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 688, 690 (1972); see also Brewer v. Williams, 430
U.S. 387, 398 (1977) (holding that a person's Sixth Amendment counsel rights attach
when "judicial proceedings have been initiated against him 'whether by way of formal
charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment'"). Moreover,
when the trial process is completed, the "prosecution" ends and the Sixth Amend-
ment counsel provision becomes inapplicable. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING
CRIuMNAL PROCEDURE 518 (2d ed. 1997). Despite the fact that the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel terminates at the completion of trial, claims that counsel rights were
denied at trial may be raised in postconviction proceedings. See, e.g., CHARLES H.
WHITEBREAD & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 760-61, 888-97 (3rd ed.
1993).
5 See infra Part Ill.
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II. SUPREME COURT CASES AND SIXTH AMENDMENT VALUES
Since its first major discussion in the 1932 decision Powell v.
Alabama,6 the United States Supreme Court has decided nu-
merous cases raising a variety of issues under the Right to Coun-
sel Clause of the Sixth Amendment.7 These cases, in turn,
articulate several disparate interests sought to be protected by
the right to counsel provision.
No attempt will here be made to chronicle the whole of the
Court's performance. Rather, several representative cases will
be highlighted in order to illustrate the relevant values at the
foundation of the Right to Counsel Clause.
A. FAIRNESS
The most prominent value bottoming the Sixth Amend-
ment right to counsel provision is the concern for providing fair
trials for criminal defendants.8 The cases seek to protect the
fairness value not only during the actual trial9 but also under
certain circumstances during the pretrial phase.'0
In Gideon v. Wainwright," the Court addressed the unfairness
inherent when defendants are financially unable to obtain
counsel during trial. In Gideon, the Court recognized the appli-
cability of the Sixth Amendment counsel right to the States
6287 U.S. 45 (1932) (upholding right to counsel for indigent defendants in capital
punishment case); 3 WAYNE R. LAFAvE ET AT, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 459 (2d ed. 1992)
("The first major Supreme Court discussion of the constitutional right to counsel
came in Powel").
7 See 3 LAFAvE ET A-, supra note 6, at 304-14, 458-68.
' "The purpose of the sixth amendment right to counsel is to protect the integrity
of the adversary system of criminaljustice." Note, Government Intrusions Into the Defense
Camp: Undermining the Right to Counsel 97 HARv. L. REv. 1143, 1144 (1984). See infra
notes 11-29 and accompanying text.
9 See infra notes 11-17 and accompanying text.
,See infra notes 18-29 and accompanying text.
"372 U.S. 335, 341-45 (1963).
SId. at 342. The Court had earlier held in Betts v. Brady that denying state ap-
pointed counsel to indigent defendants did not necessarily constitute "fundamental
unfairness" under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. There-
fore, the Betts Court found that the Right to Counsel Clause of the Sixth Amendment
did not apply to the States. 316 U.S. 455, 461-62 (1942), overruled by Gideon v. Wain-
wright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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and held that indigent defendants were entitled to counsel at
state expense.'3 The court noted:
[R] eason and reflection require us to recognize that in our adversary sys-
tem of criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is too poor to
hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for
him. This seems to us to be an obvious truth. Governments, both state
and federal, quite properly spend vast sums of money to establish ma-
chinery to try defendants accused of crime. Lawyers to prosecute are
everywhere deemed essential to protect the public's interest in an or-
derly society. Similarly, there are few defendants charged with crime,
few indeed, who fail to hire the best lawyers they can get to prepare and
present their defenses. That government hires lawyers to prosecute and
defendants who have the money hire lawyers to defend are the strongest
indications of the widespread belief that lawyers in criminal courts are
necessities, not luxuries .... From the very beginning, our state and na-
tional constitutions and laws have laid great emphasis on procedural and
substantive safeguards designed to assure fair trials before impartial tri-
bunals in which every defendant stands equal before the law. This noble
ideal cannot be realized if the poor man charged with crime has to face
his accusers without a lawyer to assist him. 4
The Gideon Court recognized the unfairness of forcing a de-
fendant untrained in the law to defend himself against the
power and legal acumen of the State.' s Fairness requires rough
equality between adversarial opponents.
16
13 Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344. In Gideon the defendant, Gideon, was charged with a
felony, was refused state funded counsel, and, consequently, was forced to defend
himself at trial. Gideon was eventually convicted and sentenced to prison from which
he petitioned the courts for habeas corpus relief. Id. at 336-37.
Subsequent to Gideon, the Supreme Court held that indigent defendants do not
enjoy a right to counsel at state expense if they are not sentenced to a term of impris-
onment upon conviction after having defended themselves pro se at trial. See Scott v.
Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1979).
'4 Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344.
15 Id.
'
6 Professor Tomkovicz has expressed the role of the right to counsel as follows:
[O]ur adversary system... contemplates a contest between opposing sides. By na-
ture, one of those sides is significantly more powerful in most, if not all, relevant respects.
The grant of counsel to the inherently inferior defendant is designed to promote balanced
contests by equalizing the adversaries. Counsel brings legal expertise, knowledge of the
system, tactical and strategic savvy, and a commitment to the defense of the accused against
state efforts to impose a criminal penalty.
Tomkovicz, supra note 2, at 753.
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While the right to counsel originally extended to trials
alone, 7 the Court eventually extended the right to certain pre-
trial contexts. Thus, in Massiah v. United States 8 the Government
made evidentiary use of incriminating statements made by a de-
fendant while he was free on bail after having been indicted for
a federal narcotics offense. The Government obtained the
statements by surreptitiously monitoring conversations between
the defendant and a co-defendant who had agreed to cooperate
with the government and to permit the installation of a radio
transmitter under the seat of his car.19 While the defendant had
retained a lawyer prior to being released on bail, the lawyer was
not present at the time of the conversations with the co-
defendant.0 The Supreme Court eventually held that the Gov-
ernment had violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights
by "deliberately elicit[ing]" the statements from him after he
had been indicted and in the absence of counsel.2 As a conse-
quence, the Court reversed the defendant's conviction and
suppressed the use of the tainted statements in any subsequent
trial.2
2
The Massiah Court offered little explanation for the basis of
its holding.23 Indeed, sixteen years after its decision, Chief Jus-
7 d. at 754.
"377 U.S. 201 (1964).
"Id. at 202-03.
"Id.
2'1 Id. at 204, 206.
2Id. at 207.
"The Massiah Court did appeal to two prior cases, Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315
(1959) and Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), for authoritative support. In Spano,
the Court reversed a state criminal conviction because a confession obtained by direct
police interrogation had wrongly been admitted against the defendant at his trial.
The Massiah Court focused on the theory of the concurringJustices in Spano that "the
Constitution required reversal of the conviction upon the sole and specific ground
that the confession had been deliberately elicited by the police after the defendant
had been indicted, and therefore at a time when he was clearly entitled to a lawyer's
help." 377 U.S. at 204 (citing Spano, 360 U.S. at 327 (Stewart, J., concurring)). The
Massiah Court noted that our system contemplates that "an indictment be followed by
a trial in an orderly courtroom, presided over by a judge, open to the public, and
protected by all the procedural safeguards of the law." Id. The Court further noted
that, "a Constitution which guarantees a defendant the aid of counsel at such a trial
could surely vouchsafe no less to an indicted defendant under interrogation by the
police in a completely extrajudicial proceeding." Id. The Court apparently saw little
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tice Rehnquist would lament that "[t]he doctrinal underpin-
nings of Massiah have been largely left unexplained."24 In light
of this, the ChiefJustice offered the following rationale, noting
however that the Massiah decision was "difficult to reconcile
with the traditional notions of the role of an attorney."2
Historically and in practice, in our country at least, [a hearing] has
always included the right to the aid of counsel when desired and pro-
vided by the party asserting the right. The right to be heard would be, in
many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard
by counsel. Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and
sometimes no skill in the science of law. If charged with crime, he is in-
capable, generally, of determining for himself whether the indictment is
good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left without
the aid of counsel, he may be put on trial without a proper charge, and
convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the is-
sue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and knowledge
adequately to prepare his defense, even though he may have a perfect
one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel every step in the proceed-
ings against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the dan-
ger of conviction because he does not know how to establish his26innocence.
With Massiah's realization that the Sixth Amendment right
to counsel was not limited alone to the actual trial phase, the
Supreme Court subsequently recognized the applicability of the
relevance in the fact that the defendant in Spano was aware that he was being interro-
gated by the police at the time he confessed while the defendant in Massiah was
oblivious to the fact that he was being "interrogated" by the police, or at least by one
working with the police.
The Massiah Court's reliance on the Powell case was fleeting. The Court merely
quoted Powels proposition that "during perhaps the most critical period of the pro-
ceedings... that is ... from the time of their arraignment until the beginning of
their trial, when consultation, thoroughgoing investigation and preparation [are] vi-
tally important, the defendants... [are] as much entitled to [aid of counsel] during
that period as at the trial itself." I at 205 (quoting Powel, 287 U.S. at 57).
'2 United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 290 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Commentators agree. A careful observer of the Court's work has observed: "The
Court has yet to proffer an in-depth constitutional justification for the Massiah right."
James J. Tomkovicz, An Adversary System Defense of the Right to Counsel Against Infor-
mants: Truth, FairPlay, and the Massiah Doctrine, 22 U.C. DAVIs L. REv. 1, 22 (1988).
Henry, 447 U.S. at 290 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist saw those
"traditional notions" specifically as the ability to hold private unencumbered lawyer
client consultations as often as desired, interests in no way offended in Massiah. I&
Id. at 291-92 (RehnquistJ., dissenting) (quoting Powell 287 U.S. at 68-69).
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counsel right to a variety of pretrial contexts. In each instance
the Court's concern was to protect against governmental cir-
cumvention of the ideal of maintaining a fair balance between
adversarial opponents while "the core purpose of the counsel
guarantee [is] to assure 'Assistance' at trial, when the accused
[is] confronted with both the intricacies of the law and the ad-
vocacy of the public prosecutor."28 Massiah and its progeny thus
embrace the view that cherished trial protections may become
irrelevant if the accused is already "convicted" through pretrial
governmental activities.
The trial fairness interest articulated by cases such as Gideon
and Massiah vindicates rights personal to the accused. The in-
terest is aimed at sparing the accused the harm inherent in be-
ing forced to face the power of government prosecution without
the ability to deal effectively with the complexities of the crimi-
nal justice process. As such, the fairness interest speaks to pro-
tecting procedural rights of the accused rather than to
punishing the government for violation of a protected substan-
tive interest.2
27 As noted above, the Sixth Amendment right applies after the "initiation of ad-
versary judicial proceedings," ordinarily requiring a formal commitment of the gov-
ernment to prosecute as evidenced by the filing of charges. See supra note 4. See also
3 LAFAVE ET AL, supra note 6, at 497. Once a "criminal prosecution" is triggered the
Supreme Court has held that the right to counsel applies only to "critical stages" of
the prosecution. Id. at 496-97. Applying this test, the Court has found that an ac-
cused has the right to counsel at first judicial appearances where non-binding pleas
are entered, seeWhite v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59, 60 (1963); at arraignments where de-
fenses not there raised are abandoned by law, see Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52,
53-54 (1961); at post-indictment lineups, see United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 237
(1967); at preliminary hearings, see Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1970); and,
as discussed above, in situations where the government seeks to elicit inculpatory
statements, see supra notes 17-26 and accompanying text. But see United States v. Ash,
413 U.S. 300, 321 (1973) (no right to counsel at police initiated photo identification).
' Ash, 413 U.S. at 309. In a subsequent case, the Court noted:
[T)he assistance of counsel cannot be limited to participation in a trial ... Recognizing
that the right to the assistance of counsel is shaped by the need for the assistance of coun-
sel, we have found that the right attaches at earlier, "critical" stages in the criminal justice
process "where the results might well ... reduce the trial itself to a mere formality."
Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 170 (1985) (quoting Wade, 388 U.S. at 224).
"Within the bill of rights protections relating to the criminal justice system, the
exclusion of illegally obtained evidence sometimes operates to deter governmental
infringements of protected substantive interests. In Fourth Amendment jurispru
4MARTINR. GARDNER
B. SUBSTANTIVE INTERESTS IN ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVACY
Along different lines, Supreme Court case law has obliquely
suggested that Sixth Amendment interests are violated when the
government acts in ways perceived as interfering with the coun-
sel rights of an accused even though no unfairness to the ac-
cused actually results. In such cases, the Court implies that the
Sixth Amendment speaks not simply to protecting the accused
from actual unfairness but also to deterring the government
from certain conduct deemed inimical to the right to counsel.
This view appears to recognize that the Sixth Amendment pro-
tects substantive interests in addition to promoting the proce-
dural goal of trial fairness.
For example, in United States v. Morrison" the Supreme
Court assumed a Sixth Amendment violation in a case in which
the accused suffered no actual interference with her right to
counsel and thus incurred no unfairness as a result of the viola-
tion. In Morrison, two federal drug enforcement officials con-
fronted the accused, who had been indicted and had retained
counsel, and outside counsel's presence and without his knowl-
edge or permission urged the accused to cooperate in a related
investigation, promising benefits for cooperation and threaten-
ing ajail term if the accused failed to cooperate.31 During the
course of their conversations, the federal officials, aware that
dence, for example, evidence obtained through illegal searches and seizures is sup-
pressed in order to discourage governmental violations of protected privacy. See, e.g.,
Martin P, Gardner, The Emerging Good Faith Exception to the Miranda Rule--A Critique,
35 HASTINGS L.J. 429, 432-39 (1984). On the other hand, in the context of the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, coerced confessions and other in-
criminating evidence are excluded to protect the procedural rights of the accused
rather than as a vehicle for shaping governmental conduct. Id. at 441-68; Martin R
Gardner, Section 1983 Actions Under Miranda: A Critical View of the Right to Avoid Interro-
gation, 30 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1277 (1993).
For an extensive discussion of the complex of values contained within the general
concept of trial fairness, see Tomkovicz, supra note 24, at 39-62. For a discussion of
Sixth Amendment fairness interests as "instrumental" (i.e., meant to avoid "actual ad-
versary prejudice to the accused") rather then "intrinsic" (i.e., meant to vindicate "re-
spect for intrinsic integrity of the accused") see Philip Halpern, Government Intrusion
into the Attorney-Client Relationship: An Interest Analysis of Rights and Remedies, 32 BuFF. L.
REV. 127, 133-36 (1983).
S449 U.S. 361, 364 (1981). The Court "assume[d], without deciding, that the
Sixth Amendment was violated in the circumstances of [Morrison]." Id.
" Id. at 362.
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the accused had been indicted and had retained counsel, dis-
paraged her counsel and suggested that better and less costly
representation could be obtained from the public defender.
2
The accused declined to cooperate, made no statement in any
way pertinent to her case, and immediately notified her attorney
of the confrontation.-" The accused continued to rely on her
retained counsel and eventually sought to have her indictment
dismissed on the ground that the federal officials had violated
her Sixth Amendment right to counsel? The trial court denied
the motion to dismiss. The accused was subsequently con-
victed and appealed.m
The case eventually reached the Supreme Court which
granted certiorari to consider whether the extraordinary rem-
edy of dismissal was appropriate in the absence of some adverse
consequence to the representation the accused received or to
the fairness of the proceedings brought against her.37 The
Court assumed that a Sixth Amendment violation had oc-
currede but found that in the absence of "demonstrable preju-
dice, or substantial threat thereof, dismissal of the indictment
[was] plainly inappropriate, even though the violation may have
been deliberate." 9 While denying the drastic remedy of dis-
missal, the Court nevertheless condemned the "egregious be-
havior of the Government agents" in the case and allowed that
"in cases such as this, a Sixth Amendment violation may... be





'I. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the trial court
and concluded that the action against the accused (Morrison) should be dismissed.
Id.
7 Id. at 363-64.
'" While early in its opinion the Morrison Court specifically assumed a Sixth Amend-
ment violation, see supra note 30, the Court expressed a more tentative view later in
the opinion by noting that "[t ] he Sixth Amendment violation, if any, accordingly pro-
vides no justification for interfering with the criminal proceedings... against Morri-
son, much less the drastic relief [dismissal] granted by the Court of Appeals." Id.
(emphasis added).
9 Id. at 365.
0Id. at 367.
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The Court did not elaborate on the nature of the Sixth
Amendment interest offended in Morrison nor on what it was
about the Governmental conduct that it found "egregious." In-
deed, given the absence of any semblance of unfairness to the
accused resulting from the government's actions, it is difficult to
identify the nature of the constitutional evil inherent in Mon-i-
son. In any event, the Court clearly intimated that the initiation
of adversarial proceedings against the accused insulated her
from the kind of governmental intrusions at stake in the case,
intrusions that would be perfectly permissible under Fourth and
Fifth Amendment principles.4' Moreover, because the govern-
ment obtained no unfair advantage through its intrusion, the
intrusion itself appears to be the evil. As such, the Court seems
to have envisioned a Sixth Amendment right to be free from the
kind of intrusion at issue in Morrison. Such a view suggests rec-
ognition of a Sixth Amendment right to privacy, a substantive
right 42 totally distinct from the more traditional Sixth Amend-
' From the facts of Morrison, it does not appear that the police confrontation of
the accused constituted a "seizure" of her person so as to trigger the Fourth Amend-
ment proscription against "unreasonable searches and seizures." See e.g., United
States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 544 (1980) (holding that a person is "seized" only
if under the circumstances a "reasonable person would have believed that he was not
free to leave"). Moreover, because the accused made no statement that was used
against her, neither the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination nor the
Miranda doctrine, see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), would find anything
constitutionally offensive in Morrison. See Arnold H. Loewy, Police-Obtained Evidence
and the Constitution: Distinguishing Unconstitutionally Obtained Evidence from Unconstitu-
tionally Used Evidence, 87 MsCs-. L. REv. 907, 916-28, 933-36 (1989). The police con-
frontation in Morrison does not appear to constitute "custodial interrogation" so as to
trigger Miranda. See e.g., Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984). Even if the ac-
cused in Morrison was subjected to "custodial interrogation" by the federal officials in
that case, the officials did no more than have discussions with the accused in an ap-
parently non-coercive context. Such conversations, even if interrogative in nature, do
not per se offend Miranda. See Gardner, Section 1983 Actions Under Miranda, supra
note 29.
4 In language reminiscent of the "sacred" right of marital privacy, see Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965), the Court has described the nature of Sixth
Amendment counsel rights as follows: "Once an accused has a lawyer, a distinct set of
constitutional safeguards aimed at preserving the sanctity of the attorney-client rela-
tionship takes effect." Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 290 n.3 (1988) (holding that
indicted defendant's Sixth Amendment rights to counsel were not violated where po-
lice questioned defendant outside presence of counsel where defendant waived coun-
sel rights after being given Miranda warnings and choosing to speak to police).
Indeed, some members of the Court apparently see attorney-client privacy as the cen-
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ment right to be free from procedural unfairness inherent in
defending oneself without the aid of counsel.
C. AUTONOMY
In addition to trial fairness and attorney-client privacy con-
cems, the Court has focused on autonomy interests of the ac-
cused as an underlying value of the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel. For example, in Faretta v. Califomia5 the Supreme
Court held that an accused who "competently and intelligently"
decides to forego his right to be represented by counsel is enti-
fled to conduct his own defense without having a lawyer forced
tral value underlying the right to counsel. "[T]he essence of the Sixth Amendment
right is... privacy of communication with counsel." Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S.
545, 563 (Marshall,J., dissenting). Weatherford is discussed in detail infra Part IIIA.
The Sixth Amendment "right to private communication" with one's lawyer derives,
in part at least, from the policies and principles underlying the attorney-client privi-
lege.
[B]y protecting the privacy of attomey-lient communications, the privilege is said to en-
courage full and fi-ank exchanges between client and counsel. If clients fear that their op-
ponents may gain access to these conversations, open communication with counsel will
inevitably be chilled. As a result, an attorney may lack a full understanding of his client's
case and may thus be unable to represent his client's interests as effectively as possible.
Government Intrusion Into the Defense Camp, supra note 8, at 1145 (citations omitted).
As the above quote explains, rights to attorney-client privacy are closely related to
fair trial rights. Indeed, they may usefully be seen as prophylactic rights assuring trial
fairness. They are thus, in a sense, "instrumental" rather than "intrinsic" rights. See
Halpern, supra note 29.
On the other hand, attorney-client privacy rights are "substantive" rather than
"procedural" in the sense that they protect attorney-client privacy per se and require
no showing of prejudice or unfairness as prerequisites to their violation. These pri-
vacy rights thus have "a life of their own" and are violated at the time of governmental
intrusion into the attorney-client relationship rather than when the government
makes unfair use of the intrusion against the accused. See infra Part IVA.
While the Morrison Court alluded to a Sixth Amendment right to privacy, clearly
the Court has not recognized that an accused has an absolute right to be "let alone"
by the government once adversarial proceedings have been initiated against him. In-
deed, the Court has permitted "passive" efforts by the government to obtain incrimi-
nating evidence from an officially charged accused while counsel is not present. See,
e.g., Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 456-60 (1986) (police placed jailed informant
in same cell as accused hoping to obtain evidence against accused; incriminating
statements by accused to informant cellmate held admissible because informant had
followed instructions not to question accused but to merely listen for information).
See also infra Part I.iA. (discussing Weatherford v. Bursey).
422 U.S. 806 (1975).
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upon him against his will." The Court grounded its recognition
of the right to proceed pro se on the "inestimable worth of free
choice" entailed as an inherent Sixth Amendment value.45 The
Court explained the rationale for its holding as follows:
The right to defend is personal. The defendant, and not his lawyer or
the State, will bear the personal consequences of a conviction. It is the
defendant, therefore, who must be free personally to decide whether in
his particular case counsel is to his advantage. And although he may
conduct his own defense ultimately to his own detriment, his choice
must be honored out of "that respect for the individual which is the life-
blood of the law."4
The Court's acknowledgment that exercise. of one's right to
defend oneself might redound to his detriment is a clear reali-
zation that the underlying constitutional value identified in
Faretta is different from, and perhaps at odds with, the trial fair-
ness value espoused in Gideon and Massiah.47
"Id. at 835.
"Id. at 834. The Court stated:
The Sixth Amendment does not provide merely that a defense shall be made for the
accused; it grants to the accused personally the right to make his defense. It is the accused,
not counsel, who must be "informed of the nature and cause of the accusation," who must
be "confronted with the witnesses against him," and who must be accorded "compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor." Although not stated in the Amendment in so
many words, the right to self-representation-to make one's own defense personally-is
thus necessarily implied by the structure of the Amendment. The right to defend is given
directly to the accused; for it is he who suffers the consequences if the defense fails.
The counsel provision supplements this design. It speaks of the "assistance" of coun-
sel, and an assistant, however expert, is still an assistant. The language and spirit of the
Sixth Amendment contemplate that counsel, like the other defense tools guaranteed by
the Amendment, shall be an aid to a willing defendant-not an organ of the State inter-
posed between an unwilling defendant and his right to defend himself personally. To
thrust counsel upon the accused, against his considered wish, thus violates the logic of the
Amendment. In such a case, counsel is not an assistant, but a master;, and the right to
make a defense is stripped of the personal character upon which the Amendment insists.
Id. at 819-20 (footnotes omitted).
In addition to this "structural" analysis, the Faretta Court also relied on historical
sources indicating that at the time of the drafting of the Sixth Amendment, the right
of self-representation was widely recognized and has remained so as evidenced by its
inclusion in the constitutions of many states. Rdt at 813-17.
46 M at 834 (quoting Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 350-51 (1970) (Brennan, J.,
concurring)).
', See supra notes 11-29 and accompanying text. Arguably, the autonomy interest
identified in Faretta was grounded on an earlier line of cases in which the Supreme
Court held that the right to counsel is violated where courts denied an accused access
to retained counsel during various stages of the process of prosecution. See, e.g.,
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The Court further elaborated on the autonomy value in
McKaskle v. Wiggins which addressed the problem of reconcil-
ing the defendant's right to proceed pro se in situations where
standby counsel has been appointed to assist the defendant
without his consent.49 The McKaskLe Court reaffirmed the right
to proceed pro se as an affirmation of "the dignity and autonomy
of the accused." ° Allowing that "occasionally" an accused pro-
ceeding pro se might actually present his "best possible de-
fense,"5 ' the Court nevertheless acknowledged that in most cases
"the right of self-representation is a right that when exercised
usually increases the likelihood of a trial outcome unfavorable
to the defendant."5 2 Thus, while vindicating the defendant's
autonomy, employment of the right to proceed pro se often
compromises the defendant's interest in obtaining a fair trial.
The McKaskle Court found that the presence of standby
counsel does not infringe on the pro se defendant's rights so
long as the defendant retains "actual control over the case he
chooses to present to the jury."" Moreover, "participation by
standby counsel without the defendant's consent should not be
allowed to destroy the jury's perception that the defendant is
representing himself."5 4  The Court explained: "The defen-
Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3, 10 (1954) (accused denied right to counsel when he
was made to answer state habitual criminal charge without affording him an oppor-
tunity to retain counsel); Glasser v. United States, 815 U.S. 60, 75-76 (1942), supeieded
by statute, Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171 (1987) (accused has Sixth Amend-
ment right to exclusive services of lawyer he retains, thus accused denied right to
counsel when court ordered his retained counsel also to represent a co-defendant).
Note that Fretag, a state case, was decided before the Sixth Amendment was held ap-
plicable to the states. The Court appealed to the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment in finding that defendants "must be given a reasonable
opportunity to employ and consult with counsel." Fretag, 348 U.S. at 10.
44 465 U.S. 168 (1984).
49 In McKaskkI the trial court appointed standby counsel to assist the pm se defen-
dant. The defendant at times voiced objection to the appointment, while at other
times he cooperated with the standby. During the trial the defendant and standby
often expressed disagreements, sometimes in the presence of the jury. In every in-
stance of disagreement calling for a ruling from the bench, the court ruled in favor of
defendant rather than the standby. Id.
oId at 176-77.
"Id. at 177.
2 Id. at 177 n.8.




dant's appearance in the status of one conducting his own de-
fense is important in a criminal trial since the right to appear
pro se exists to affirm the accused's individual dignity and
autonomy."55 Given these provisions, the McKaskle Court saw no
need to categorically bar the participation of standby counsel.5
III. THE NEBULOUS RIGHT TO ATroRNEY-CLENT PRiVACY IN
SUPREME COURT CASE LAW
While the Court has alluded to three values-trial fairness,
substantive privacy interests, and respecting the autonomy of
the accused-as reflected in the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel, close consideration of the Court's work makes clear
that the fairness and autonomy interests are the primary, and
perhaps the only, values presently bottoming the right to coun-
sel. As this section of the Article will demonstrate, Morrison's
nod towards the existence of a substantive right to attorney-
client privacy as a value distinct from those of procedural fair-
ness and personal autonomy has rarely been explicitly em-
braced by the Court, and when it has, it has been met with
intense criticism.
Several Supreme Court cases raise the question of the exis-
tence of a substantive interest in attorney-client privacy as a dis-
tinct value underlying the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
The cases fall into two categories: situations where the govern-
ment infiltrates an actual attorney-client conference, and where,
as in Massiah and its progeny, the government engages an ac-
cused outside the presence of counsel at a time when the right
to counsel has been triggered by the initiation of adversary pro-
ceedings.
sId
Id. at 182. While the autonomy interest is clearly recognized by the Court as an
independent underlying value supporting the Right to Counsel Clause, this Article
will pay little further attention to autonomy interests but will instead focus on the in-
terplay between the fairness and privacy values.
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A. INFILTRATION OF ATTORNEY-CLIENT CONFERENCES
In Weatherford v. Bursey,57 a case where an undercover Gov-
ernmental agent participated in conferences between an ac-
cused and his counsel, the Court was presented with an
opportunity to recognize a substantive Sixth Amendment inter-
est in attorney-client privacy. Over the strong dissent of Justices
Marshall and Brennan,-" the Court found no violation of the ac-
cused's right to counsel .
Weatherford arose through a civil rights action under 42
U.S.C. § 19830 brought by the accused, Bursey, against the un-
dercover agent, Weatherford, who had feigned participation
with Bursey in vandalizing a Selective Service office.6 1 Weather-
ford immediately reported the incident to the police who, in
order to maintain Weatherford's undercover status and retain
his ability to work on other current matters, arrested Weather-
ford and ostensibly charged him along with Bursey with the of-
fense. Bursey and Weatherford were both released on bond
and Bursey retained counsel. 62 In spite of the fact that they sus-
pected the presence of an undercover informant, on two occa-
sions Bursey and his counsel invited Weatherford to participate
in attorney-client meetings in an effort to obtain information,
ideas, or suggestions relative to Bursey's defense.0 Again in or-
der not to divulge his undercover status, Weatherford met with
Bursey and his counsel in pre-trial conferences but did not pass
on any information regarding Bursey's trial plans or strategy.64
By the time of Bursey's trial, Weatherford's effectiveness as an
." 429 U.S. 545 (1977).
Id. at 561 (Marshall and Brennan,J.J., dissenting).
'9 Id. at 556.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1999) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or us-
age, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be sub-
jected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.
61 Weatherford, 429 U.S. at 547.




undercover agent had deteriorated.6 As a consequence,
Weatherford testified against Bursey detailing his undercover
activities and giving an eyewitness account of Bursey's acts of
vandalism.& Bursey was convicted and subsequently brought his
§ 1983 action against Weatherford, alleging that he had com-
municated defense strategies to the. government thus depriving
Bursey of the effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth
Amendment. 67
The district court found that no information relative to Bur-
sey's defense had been passed on to the government and there-
fore denied Bursey's claim.68 Bursey appealed to the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals, which reversed, finding that even
though the government learned nothing from Weatherford's
meetings with Bursey and his counsel "whenever the prosecu-
tion knowingly arranges and permits intrusion into the attorney-
client relationship the right to counsel is sufficiently endan-
gered to require reversal and a new trial."69 The Supreme Court
granted Weatherford's petition for certiorari and reversed, find-
ing no violation of Bursey's Sixth Amendment rights.70
In denying Bursey's Sixth Amendment claim, the Court
noted the protection of attorney-client privacy as an important
Sixth Amendment consideration 7' but paid particular attention
to the fact that Bursey's fairness interests had not been offended
by Weatherford's access to Bursey's meetings with his lawyer.
72
The Court explained:
Had Weatherford testified at Bursey's trial as to the conversation be-
tween Bursey and Wise [Bursey's counsel]; had any of the State's evi-
dence originated in these conversations; had those overheard





69 Bursey v. Weatherford, 528 F.2d 483, 486 (4th Cir. 1975). The Fourth Circuit
found that Bursey was entitled to have his conviction reversed even though he had
merely claimed money damages under § 1983.
70 Weatheford, 429 U.S. at 550.
"' See infra text accompanying note 80.
72Weatherford, 429 U.S. at 554.
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conversations been used in any other way to the substantial detriment of
Burse; or even had the prosecution learned from Weatherford, an un-
dercover agent, the details of the Bursey-Wise conversations about trial
preparations, Bursey would have a much stronger case.73
Such a view suggests that Bursey would have a "strong" Sixth
Amendment case only if he could show that the government
used against him information obtained by Weatherford. Such
use would raise fairness issues actionable under the right to
counsel. Mere invasions of attorney-client privacy, on the other
hand, would thus appear to be constitutionally permissible.
The matter is not so simple, however, in light of the fact
that the invasion of attorney-client privacy in Weatheford was not
made in bad faith. Moreover, the Court attended to the practi-
cal realities of undercover police work in noting that
this is not a situation where the State's purpose was to learn what it could
about the defendant's defense plans and the informant was instructed to
intrude on the lawyer-client relationship or where the informant has as-
sumed for himself that task and acted accordingly. Weatherford, the
District Court found, did not intrude at all; he was invited to the meet-
ing, apparently not for his benefit but for the benefit of Bursey and his
lawyer. Weatherford went, not to spy, but because he was asked and be-
cause the State was interested in retaining his undercover services on
other matters and it was therefore necessary to avoid raising the suspi-
cion that he was in fact the informant whose existence Bursey and Wise
already suspected.
That the per se rule adopted by the Court of Appeals would operate
prophylactically and effectively is very likely true; but it would require
the informant to refuse to participate in attorney-client meetings, even
though invited, and thus for all practical purposes to unmask himself.
Our cases, however, have recognized the unfortunate necessity of un-
dercover work and the value it often is to effective law enforcement.
7 4
It is thus unclear whether Bursey's Sixth Amendment rights
would have been violated if Weatherford had purposely injected
himself into Bursey's attorney-client conferences in order to ob-
tain information relating to Bursey's defense strategy even if no
such information was obtained. The relevance of Weatherford's
motivations raises interesting questions not explored in detail by
Id. at 557.
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the Weatherford Court.75  Why should it matter if Weatherford
had invaded Bursey's conferences with his counsel in order to un-
fairly disadvantage Bursey so long as no information was
gleaned to prejudice Bursey? Assuming that such bad faith
conduct by Weatherford would violate Bursey's right to counsel
rights, what underlying Sixth Amendment value would be of-
fended? Two explanations appear possible, one finding an of-
fense to the fairness value, the other recognizing a violation of
the value of attorney-client privacy.
1. Bad Faith Intrusions and Unfairness
Purposeful but unsuccessful attempts by governmental
agents to obtain an unfair advantage over an officially accused
adversary might be viewed as Sixth. Amendment violations be-
cause they create an undue risk of actually obtaining an unfair
violation. Similar to the substantive crime of attempt,7 govern-
mental intrusions into an accused's conferences with his coun-
sel in order to obtain an unfair advantage over the accused
which result in no actual unfair advantage in the particular case
may be viewed as inchoate violations of the accused's Sixth
Amendment interest in a fair balance vis a vis his adversarial
opponent. Proof that an informer reported to the prosecution
on defense strategy is a difficult matter depending upon the
willingness of the informer or the prosecutor to admit his own
wrongdoing, thus opening the door to damages suits and at-
tacks on convictions.77 Thus, to protect the fairness interest, any
7 5 Proof of the informant's motivations would always be problematic. "Establishing
that a desire to intercept confidential communications was a factor in a State's deci-
sion to keep an agent under cover will seldom be possible, since the State always can
argue plausibly that its sole purpose was to continue to enjoy the legitimate services of
the undercover agent." Id. at 565 (Marshall,J., dissenting).
76 While most crimes require a showing of actual harm, attempt and other incho-
ate crimes punish conduct intended to cause, but not actually causing, harm. See
RICHARD G. SINGER & MARTIN R. GARDNER, CRIES AND PUNISHMENT. CASES, MATERIALS,
AND READINGS IN CRimNAL LAW 525-69 (2d ed. 1996). Attempt may be understood as
a crime punishing culpable conduct that risks, but does not cause, harm. Id.
The point was made by the Weatherford dissenters. Weatherford, 429 U.S. at 565
(Marshall,J., dissenting). The majority saw the matter differently, however.
[Wie do [not] believe that federal or state prosecutors will be so prone to lie or the difli-
culties of proof will be so great that we must always assume not only that an informant
communicates what he learns from an encounter with the defendant and his counsel but
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purposeful intrusion of the attorney-client privacy of the ac-
cused in order to gain an unfair advantage might itself be
viewed as a violation of the right to counsel.
Because of the problems inherent in proving unfair advan-
tage, any intrusion by the government into an accused's confer-
ences with his attorney places at risk the accused's interest in
adversarial fairness regardless of the motivations of the govern-
mental intruder. Where the intruder is in bad faith, as in the
situation where he intrudes in order to gain an unfair advantage
over the accused, his actions are improper and thus could, on
this view, constitute a violation of the Sixth Amendment, re-
dressed by a § 1983 action aimed at compensating the accused
and deterring future violations.78 On the other hand, where the
governmental intruder is acting in good faith, as in Weatherford,
the conduct of the government is not in obvious need of deter-
rence (because engaged in in good faith, the conduct may not
be deterrable in any event)9 and whatever risk of unfairness to
the accused is outweighed by the perceived law enforcement
benefits obtained through the use of undercover informants.
2. Bad Faith Intrusions and Attorney-Client Privacy
If the Sixth Amendment is violated when the government
infiltrates the attorney-client conferences of an accused adver-
sary in an unsuccessful attempt to obtain an unfair adversarial
advantage, the Sixth Amendment violation suggested therein by
the Weatherford Court might be grounded in attorney-client pri-
vacy as a value independent of concerns for adversarial fairness.
The Weatherford Court noted that "the Sixth Amendment's assis-
tance-of-counsel guarantee can be meaningfully implemented
also that what he communicates has the potential for detriment to the defendant or bene-
fit to the prosecutor's case.
Id. at 556-57.
" For discussion of deterrence theory in the context of § 1983 actions, see gener-
ally, Gardner, Section 1983 Actions Under Miranda, supra note 29. Deterrence could
theoretically be achieved by a damage judgment against the government, or, in ex-
treme cases, by dismissing the charges against the accused.
" For discussion of deterrence theory in the context of good faith governmental
conduct and the Fourth Amendment, see 1 WAvE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEZURE: A
TREATMS ON THE FOURTHAMENDMENT 51-101 (3d ed. 1996).
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only if a criminal defendant knows that his communications
with his attorney are private and that his lawful preparations are
secure against intrusion by the government, his adversary in the
criminal proceeding."0
Unjustified invasions of attomey-client privacy might thus
be viewed as violations of the Sixth Amendment even where no
unfair advantage is obtained by the government if the invasion
threatens free communication between attorney and client in
much the same way that unjustified invasions of a person's pri-
vacy outside the attomey-client context constitute violations of
the Fourth Amendment even if the invasion yields no evidence
to be used against the person.81 Where the government invades
attomey-client privacy for the purpose of obtaining an adversar-
ial advantage, its action is in bad faith and therefore unjustified.
On the other hand, where in Weatheford the intrusion was made
in good faith and, as with certain good faith privacy intrusions
in the Fourth Amendment context, 2 appears not be of a kind
appropriate for application of the deterrence function underly-
ing a § 1983 action under the Sixth Amendments especially be-
cause there was no evidence that the intrusion negatively
impacted the free communication of Bursey and his attorney.
3. Fairness as the Predominant Value?
Dicta in the Weatherford opinion suggests that a violation of
Bursey's Sixth Amendment rights would have occurred had
Weatherford invaded Bursey's meetings with his counsel for the
purpose of gaining access to trial strategy or other matters per-
tinent to Busey's defense.s As the above discussion illustrates,
such a violation can be understood in terms of an offense
against either the faimess or attorney-client privacy value.
80 Weatherford, 429 U.S. at 554 n.4 (quoting Brief for United States at 71, Hoffa v.
United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966) (No. 32)). See supra note 42 for a discussion of
interrelationship of substantive rules of Sixth Amendment privacy with procedural
rules protecting Sixth Amendment fairness.
S, See supra note 79.
"See supra note 79.
"See supra text accompanying note 79.
Weatherford, 429 U.S. at 554.
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Whatever the theoretical implications of its dicta, the Weath-
erford Court focuses much more heavily on fairness rather than
attorney-client privacy as the relevant Sixth Amendment value.
While paying lip service to the privacy value" the Court repeat-
edly appeals to the absence of unfairness to Bursey as the basis
for denying his Sixth Amendment claim.
As long as the information possessed by Weatherford remained uncom-
municated, he posed no substantial threat to Bursey's Sixth Amendment
rights.... We may disapprove an investigatory practice only if it violates
the Constitution; and judged in this light, the Court of Appeals' per se
rule cuts much too broadly. If for example, Weatherford at Bursey's invita-
tion had attended a meeting between Bursey and Wise but Wise had become suspi-
cious and the conversation was confined to the weather or other harmless subjects,
the Court of Appeals' rule, literally read, would cloud Bursey's subse-
quent conviction, although there would have been no constitutional violation.
The same would have been true if Wise had merely asked whether Weatherford was
an informant, Weatherford had denied it, and the meeting then had ended; like-
wise if the entire conversation had consisted of Wise's questions and
Weatherford's answers about Weatherford's own defense plans. Also,
and more cogently for present purposes, unless Weatherford communi-
cated the substance of the Bursey-Wise conversations and thereby cre-
ated at least a realistic possibility of injury to Bursey or benefit to the
State, there can be no Sixth Amendment violation. Yet under the Court
of Appeals' rule, Bursey's conviction would have been set aside on ap-
peal.
There being no tainted evidence in this case, no communication of
defense strategy to the prosecution, and no purposeful intrusion by
Weatherford, there was no violation of the Sixth Amendment....s
By seeing "no constitutional violation" if Weatherford's
presence had actually chilled Bursey's open communication
with his lawyer by "ending" communication or inducing mere
talk of "harmless subjects," the Court implies that protecting at-
torney-client privacy is not, after all, an independent Sixth
Amendment value. Moreover, the Court of Appeals ruling that
the Sixth Amendment is violated "whenever the prosecution
knowingly arranges or permits intrusion into the attorney-client
' See supra text accompanying note 80 for the Court's only reference to attorney-
client privacy.
6Weatherford, 429 U.S. at 556-58 (emphasis added); see also supra text accompany-
ing note 73.
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relationship" of an accused8 7 appears to be a recognition of a
per se right to attorney-client privacyss In rejecting the Court of
Appeals rule and focusing on the value of adversarial fairness,
the Court appears to have minimized, if not rejected altogether,
attorney-client privacy as an independent Sixth Amendment
value.
B. ENGAGING AN ACCUSED OUTSIDE THE PRESENCE OF COUNSEL
As noted above, Massiah and its progeny recognize viola-
tions of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel if the govern-
ment "deliberately elicits" incriminating information from an
officially charged accused at a time when counsel is not present
and counsel rights have not been waived.' Some of the cases
examine situations where the accused is in custody and encoun-
ters an undercover governmental informer.90 Other cases deal
with custodial encounters with known governmental agents,9'
while some cases, like Massiah itself, treat issues of undercover
informants in non-custodial contexts.2
While the Massiah line of cases does not address situations
where the accused is in direct communication with his lawyer, as
in Weatherford, the cases do, nevertheless, provide a vehicle for
examining the extent to which attorney-client privacy is a dis-
tinct Sixth Amendment value. The cases concern accused per-
" Bursey v. Weatherford, 528 F.2d 483, 486 (4th Cir. 1975); see also supra text ac-
companying note 69.
' The Courts of Appeals rule does speak in terms of the Sixth Amendment being
"endangered" "whenever the prosecution knowingly arranges and permits intrusion
into the attorney-client relationship." Bursey, 528 F.2d at 486. While such language
might suggest that the privacy invasion itself may not constitute the violation, the
Weatherford dissenters appeared to see the Court of Appeals rule as embracing attor-
ney-client privacy as an independent Sixth Amendment value. In their discussion ad-
vocating "a per se rule of [the] sort" espoused by the Court of Appeals the dissenters
stated: "[T]he only way to assure that defendants will feel free to communicate can-
didly with their lawyers is to prohibit the government from intercepting such confi-
dential communications." Weatherford, 429 U.S. at 565-66 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Such an interpretation plausibly accounts for the Court of Appeals rule solely in
terms of the attorney-client privacy value.
9 See supra notes 18-23 and accompanying text; infra Parts m.B.1-.3.
See infra Part III.B.2.
" See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1976); see also infra Part III.B. 1.
SeeMaine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159 (1985); see also infra Part III.B.3.
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sons who are entitled to access to counsel at the time the gov-
ernment engages them. To the extent such accused persons are
granted insulation from governmental intrusion under the
Sixth Amendment, they appear to be recipients of privacy pro-
tection through their right to counsel. An examination of the
cases suggests that, while such a theory explains its cases, the
Court has explicitly embraced the privacy rationale in only one
case 93 late in the Massiah line. In the remainder of the cases the
Court, as in the Massiah case itself, renders its decisions without
appealing to any underlying Sixth Amendment value or by ref-
erence to the fairness value. As the following discussion will re-
veal, the Court's failure to develop a consistent view of the
values underlying its cases in the Massiah line leaves the deci-
sions on an uncertain foundation and subject to considerable
controversy.
1. Brewer v. Williams
The controversial nature of Massiah's progeny is most
clearly illustrated by Brewer v. Williams,94 a case involving a police
officer, Detective Learning, who obtained incriminating state-
ments from a murder suspect while the two were riding in a po-
lice car. At the time of the encounter with Learning, the
suspect, Williams, had been arraigned, had obtained counsel,
had been given Miranda warnings several times, and had in-
formed Learning that he did not wish to speak to the police.
Learning, in turn, had promised Williams and his counsel that
he would not interrogate Williams while the two were together
in a police car transporting Williams from Davenport to Des
Moines, Iowa.95 During the ride of several hours, Learning, who
"Mouton, 474 U.S. at 159.
', 430 U.S. 387 (1977). Professor Uviller has described Brewer v. Williams as "per-
haps the most notorious of Massiah's progeny." H. Richard Uviller, Evidecefrom the
Mind of the Criminal Suspect: A Reconsideration of the Current Rules of Access and Restrain
87 COLUM. L REv. 1137, 1161 (1987). For a sample of criticism directed at the Brewer
case see, e.g., Saundra T. Brewer, Note, Brewer v. Williams: The End of Post-Charging
Interrogation?, 10 Sw. U. L REv. 331 (1978); Linda S. Buethe, Note, The Right to Coun-
sel and the Strict Waiver Standard, 57 NEB. L. REv. 543 (1978); Phillip E. Johnson, The
Return of the "Christian Burial Speech" Case, 32 EMoRY L.J. 349 (1983).
" Learning had traveled to Davenport to transport Williams to Des Moines, which
was the scene of the murder. Brewer, 430 U.S. at 391.
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suspected that Williams had murdered a 10-year-old girl several
days earlier on Christmas Eve, and Williams engaged in conver-
sation including the subject of religion. During their conversa-
tion, Learning, who knew Williams was a deeply religious man
who had recently escaped from a mental institution, made the
now famous "Christian burial speech"9 in which he asked Wl-
liams to think about the plight of the family of the dead girl,
whose body had not been found, who were unable to see their
loved one receive a proper "Christian burial." After the speech,
Leaming told Williams not to say anything but to simply think
about what he (Leaming) had said.97 Soon thereafter Williams
directed Learning to the place where the girl's body was hidden.
Williams was convicted of murder and eventually sought a
petition for habeas corpus, alleging that his statements directing
Learning to the body were inadmissible because they were ob-
tained in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
The district court agreed and issued the writ. The United States
Supreme Court eventually .affirmed, finding that by means of
the Christian burial speech Learning "deliberately... elicit[ed]"
the incriminating statements from Williams in violation of his
Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
The briefs and oral arguments referred to Leaming's words as the "Christian
burial speech." Id. at 397. Addressing Williams as "Reverend," Learning said:
I want to give you something to think about while we're traveling down the road ....
Number one, I want you to observe the weather conditions, it's raining, it's sleeting, it's
freezing, driving is very treacherous, visibility is poor, it's going to be dark early this even-
ing. They are predicting several inches of snow for tonight, and I feel that you yourself are
the only person that knows where this little girl's body is, that you yourself have only been
there once, and if you get a snow on top of it you yourself may be unable to find it. And,
since we will be going right past the area on the way into Des Moines, I feel that we could
stop and locate the body, that the parents of this little girl should be entitled to a Christian
burial for the little girl who was snatched away from them on Christmas [E]ve and mur-
dered. And I feel we should stop and locate it on the way in rather than waiting until
morning and trying to come back out after a snow storm and possibly not being able to
find it all.
Id. at 397-98.
For a detailed examination of Leaming's speech and the implications of the Brewer
case generally, see Yale Kamisar, Brewer v. Williams, Massiah, and Miranda: What is
"Interrogation"? When Does it Matter? 67 GEO. LJ. 1 (1978).
' After making the speech Learning stated: "I do not want you to answer me. I
don't want to discuss it any further. Just think about it as we're riding down the
road." Brewer, 430 U.S. at 393.
420 [Vol. 90
2000] THE S1XTHAMENDMENTRIGHT TO COUNSEL 421
The Court saw the situation as indistinguishable from the
"clear rule of Massiah that once adversary proceedings have
commenced against an individual, he has a right to legal repre-
sentation when the government interrogates him."98 The Court
disparaged Learning's "use of psychology on a person whom he
knew to be deeply religious and an escapee from a mental hos-
pital with the specific intent to elicit incriminating statements. "9
In a similar critical vein, the Court noted that "[d]espite Wil-
liams' express and implicit assertions of his right to counsel, De-
tective Learning proceeded to elicit incriminating statements
from Williams."1°° Such considerations led the Court to con-
clude that "so clear a violation of the Sixth... Amendment[] as
here occurred cannot be condoned."101
Apart from a reference to the Sixth Amendment as "indis-
pensable to the fair administration our adversary system" even at
the "pretrial stage,""0 2 the Court offered little explanation of
what Sixth Amendment value was offended by Learning's ac-
tions. The Court simply cited Massiah as determining the Brewer
result.
Not surprisingly, the Court's opinion in Brewer was not
unanimous. Four justices dissented, finding, among other
things, that the majority's position was unjustified in terms of
the fairness value. 03 For three of the four dissenters, "the only
Id. at 401.
Id. at 403.
"0 Id. at 405.
"0, Id. at 406.
'0 Id. at 398.
'03 ChiefJustice Burger expressed his disagreement as follows:
[T]he fundamental purpose of the Sixth Amendment is to safeguard the fairness of the
trial and the integrity of the factfinding process. In this case, where the evidence of how
the child's body was found is of unquestioned reliability, and since the Court accepts Wil-
liams' disclosures as voluntary and uncoerced, there is no issue either of fairness or eviden-
tiary reliability to justify suppression of truth. It appears suppression is mandated here for
no other reason than the Court's general impression that it may have a beneficial effect on
future police conduct; indeed, the Court fails to say even that much in defense of its hold-
ing.
Id. at 426 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
Justices White, Blackmun, and Rehnquist offered the following objections to the
majority's position:
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... conceivable basis for the majority's holding is the implicit
suggestion... that the right involved in Massiah... is a right
not to be asked any questions in Counsel's absence."'04 Indeed,
such a "right" to privacy from governmental intrusion may well
explain Brewer and Massiah.'0 5 If so, however, the decisions are
on very shaky ground for the Brewer dissenters, who explicitly re-
ject such a privacy interest as an underlying Sixth Amendment
value.1 °
2. Jailhouse Informer Cases
In the jailhouse informer cases, United States v. Heny 0 7 and
Kuhlmann v. Wilson,10 8 the Court addressed situations where offi-
cially accused jail inmates made incriminating statements to fel-
low inmates who were providing undercover information to the
government. In Henry, the Court found that the government
had "deliberately elicited" information from an accused, Henry,
by utilizing a paid informer'09 who, while instructed by an FBI
agent not to question Henry about his alleged crimes, neverthe-
less engaged him in conversations in which Henry made in-
The consequence of the majority's decision is, as the majority recognizes, extremely
serious. A mentally disturbed killer whose guilt is not in question may be released. Why?
Apparently the answer is that the majority believes that the law enforcement officers acted
in a way which involves some risk of injury to society and that such conduct should be de-
terred. However, the officers' conduct did not, and was not likely to, jeopardize the fair-
ness of respondent's trial or in any way risk the conviction of an innocent man-the risk
against which the Sixth Amendment guarantee of assistance of counsel is designed to pro-
tect.
ML at 437 (White,J, dissenting).
'
0 Id. at 435-36.
,0s Professor Halpern has identified violation of a protected privacy interest as one
of the evils condemned by Massiah. An "invasion occurred when the informant
sought incriminating statements from the accused .... The interest protected there
is being free from certain types of governmental exploitation and deception, regard-
less of whether inculpatory evidence is obtained and used." Halpern, supra note 29,
at 143. When in Massiah the incriminating statement was obtained in violation of the
accused's privacy interest and used at trial, a second Sixth Amendment interest, fair-
ness, was offended. Id.
"' For the dissenters, "Eq]uestions, unanswered, have no significance at all." Brew-
er, 430 U.S. at 436 (White, J., dissenting).
107 447 U.S. 264 (1980).
6 477 U.S. 436 (1986).
1 The informer worked on a contingent fee arrangement, being paid only if he
produced useful information. Henry, 447 U.S. at 270-71.
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criminating disclosures. While leaving open the question raised
by a situation "where an informant is placed in close proximity
but makes no effort to stimulate conversations about the crime
charged,"110 the Court found that the informant in Henry was not
a passive listener. The Court observed that even though the FBI
agent had instructed the informant not to take affirmative steps
to secure incriminating information, the agent "must have
known" that the circumstances would lead to that result."' The
Court noted that " [w] hen the accused is in the company of a
fellow inmate who is acting by prearrangement as a Government
agent, the [parties are not 'arms' length' adversaries]. Conver-
sation stimulated in such circumstances may elicit information
that an accused would not intentionally reveal to persons known
to be Government agents."1 Moreover, the context of incar-
ceration "imposes pressure on the accused; confinement may
bring into play subtle influences that will make him particularly
susceptible to the ploys of undercover Government agents."'
The Court concluded: "By intentionally creating a situation
likely to induce Henry to make incriminating statements with-
out the assistance of counsel, the Government violated Henry's
Sixth Amendment right to counsel."1  As a consequence, the
Court held that the statements obtained from Henry were in-
admissible.
The Henry Court never explained what Sixth Amendment
value was offended by the Government's "impermissible inter-
ference with the right to the assistance of counsel."1 5 The Court
did allude to a rule of professional responsibility forbidding
lawyers from communicating with opposing parties outside the
presence of their counsel, although the Court noted that the
professional conduct rule "does not bear on the constitutional
"' Id. at 271 n.9.
.. Id. at 271.
"'Id. at 273.
"' Id. at 274. The Court noted that the informant had managed to gain the confi-
dence of the accused who had requested the informant to assist in his plan to escape
incarceration. Id. at 266 n.2.
114 Id.
" Id. at 275.
423
424 MARTINR GARDNER [Vol. 90
issue in this case."11 6 The Court's nod to attorney-client privacy
as the value offended was given more prominent consideration
by Justice Powell who noted in his concurring opinion that the
"rule of Massiah serves the salutary purpose of preventing police
interference with the relationship between a suspect and his
counsel once formal proceedings have been initiated. But Mas-
siah does not prohibit the introduction of spontaneous state-
ments that are not elicited by governmental action.
" M
On the other hand, three dissenting Justices saw no viola-
tion of constitutionality protected values in the Henry situation.
The dissenters assessed the case in terms of the fairness interest
and found no unfairness in the Government's obtaining or us-
ing evidence obtained in the Henty case."'
"'Id. at 275 n.14. The Court said:
Although it does not bear on the constitutional question in this case, we note that
Disciplinary Rule 7-104(A)(1) of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides: "(A)
During the course of his representation of a client a lawyer shall not (1) Communicate or
cause another to communicate on the subject of the representation with a party he knows
to be represented by a lawyer in that matter unless he has the prior consent of the lawyer
representing such other party or is authorized by law to do so." See also Ethical Considera-
tion 7-19.
Id. Indeed, Professor Uviller has argued that the disciplinary rule alluded to by the
Henry Court has no relevance at all in criminal cases. See Uviller, supra note 94, at
1179-83. On the other hand, some members of the Court see the professional con-
duct rule as not only applicable in criminal cases but also of constitutional relevance.
See Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 301-02 (1988) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing
that an ethical violation rising to the level of an "impairment of the Sixth Amend-
ment right to counsel" occurs where prosecutors conduct "private interviews" with of-
ficially charged suspects for the purpose of obtaining evidence to be used at trial).
7 Henry, 447 U.S. at 276 (Powell,J., concurring).
18 "A]bsent an active, orchestrated ruse, I have great difficulty perceiving how
canons of fairness are violated when the Government uses statements flowing from a
'wrongdoer's misplaced belief that a person to whom he voluntarily confides his
wrongdoing will not reveal it.'" Id. at 281 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Hoffa
v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966)).
In a separate dissent, Justice Rehnquist concluded that "Massiah constitutes such a
substantial departure from the traditional concerns that underlie the Sixth Amend-
ment guarantee that its language, if not its actual holding, should be re-examined."
Id at 290 (RehnquistJ., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist explained his position:
"Deliberate elicitation" after formal proceedings have begun is thus not by itself de-
terminative .... If the event is not one that requires knowledge of legal procedure, in-
volves a communication between the accused and his attorney concerning investigation of
the case or the preparation of a defense, or otherwise interferes with the attorney-client re-
lationship, there is in my view simply no constitutional prohibition against the use of in-
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In Kuhlmann v. Wilson,1 9 the Court addressed the "passive
listener" situation left open by Henry. On facts similar to
Henry,'20 the Court found that the undercover informer, unlike
the informer in Henry, did not actively elicit information from
the accused but merely listened as the accused revealed in-
his 121
criminating details of his pending crime.." Justices Brennan
and Marshall dissented, finding that the informer's observation
that the accused's exculpatory account of his situation did not
sound "too good" influenced the accused to give the informer a
different and incriminating account which was subsequently re-
layed to government prosecutors. The dissenters relied on
Maine v. Moulton,12 for the proposition that "[t]he Sixth
Amendment guarantees an [officially charged] accused... the
criminating information voluntarily obtained from an accused despite the fact that his
counsel may not be present.
"Wihere is nothing in the Sixth Amendment to suggest, nor does it follow from the
general accusatory nature of our criminal scheme, that once the adversary process formally
begins the government may not make any effort to obtain incriminating evidence from the
accused when counsel is not present. The role of counsel in an adversary system is to offer
advice and assistance in the preparation of a defense and to serve as a spokesman for the
accused in technical legal proceedings. And the Sixth Amendment, of course, protects the
confidentiality of communications between the accused and his attorney. But there is no
constitutional or historical support for concluding that an accused has a right to have his
attorney serve as a sort of guru who must be present whenever an accused has an inclina-
tion to reveal incriminating information to anyone who acts to elicit such information at
the behest of the prosecution.
Id. at 299-96.
"9 477 U.S. 436 (1986).
" 'Wilson was arraigned for robbery and murder and placed in ajail cell awaiting
trial with Lee, a fellow inmate who was working as an undercover informer for the po-
lice. Id. at 439. The police, who had positive eyewitness evidence implicating Wilson,
instructed Lee to "keep his ears open" for the names of other participants but not to
question Wilson. Id. Upon entering the cell, which overlooked the scene of the
crimes, Wilson said "someone's messing with me" and immediately began talking to
Lee, narrating the same story he had given to police. Id. Lee advised Wilson that his
explanation of his situation "didn't sound too good." Id. at 439-40. Over the next few
days, Wilson began to change details of his story and, after a visit from his brother,
who expressed to Wilson that his family was upset because they believed that he had
committed the murder, eventually described his crimes to Lee who relayed the in-
formation to the police. Id. at 440. The evidence obtained by Lee was admitted into
evidence at Wilson's trial. Id. After the Henry case was handed down, Wilson sought
habeas corpus relief arguing that his Sixth Amendment rights had been violated un-
der Heny. Id. at 442.
' Id. at 460-61.
MouUon, 474 U.S. 159 (1985), is discussed in detail at infra Part III.B.3.
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right to rely on counsel as the 'medium' between himself and
the State."
123
3. Maine v. Moulton: Privacy to the Forefront
In Maine v. Moulton, a case similar on its facts to Massiah, the
Court made its most direct reference to attorney-client privacy
as the value underlying Massiah and its progeny.' 4 As in Mas-
siah, two persons, Moulton and Colson, were indicted and re-
leased on bail. Colson, unbeknownst to Moulton, decided to
cooperate with the police and was wired with a hidden elec-
tronic device which captured incriminating evidence of the
pending charges against Moulton.126 The police argued that
they placed the body wire on Colson, and also a recording de-
vice on his telephone, not to gather evidence against Moulton
for the crimes for which he was under indictment but to protect
Colson in case Moulton discovered Colson's cooperation with
the police. They argued that an additional purpose was to
gather evidence against Moulton for an inchoate plan he alleg-
edly entertained for killing a witness to the indicted crimes.'
Moreover, the police, who knew that Moulton and Colson
would discuss the pending charges in their conversation, in-
structed Colson not to question Moulton but to simply "be him-
self" during the conversations. During the conversations Colson
feigned memory lapses of details of his criminal activity with
Moulton who related numerous incriminating details of their
pending case as well as aspects of possible strategy for their up-
coming trial. Colson also encouraged Moulton to discuss the
idea of eliminating the witness but Moulton discussed the mat-
ter only briefly. Over Moulton's Sixth Amendment objection,
the State offered into evidence at Moulton's trial the incriminat-
ing statements made to Colson. The matter eventually
reached the Supreme Court, which held that while the State was
'- Kuhlman, 477 U.S. at 473 (Brennan,J., dissenting) (quoting Moulton, 474 U.S. at
176).
124 Moulton, 474 U.S. at 177 n.14.
'Id. at 164.
" Id. at 165. Colson had informed the police that Moulton planned to kill the wit-
ness. Id.
' Id. at 167.
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not precluded from investigating Moulton's possible future
criminal activity, the Sixth Amendment forbade the use of the
evidence obtained for the crimes for which he was indicted at
the time of his conversations with Colson.
28
The Moulton Court offered a lengthy discussion of Sixth
Amendment case law and underlying values. The Court ex-
plained how fairness interests required that counsel rights be
applied to certain pretrial proceedings lest the "results [there]
might well settle the accused's fate and reduce the trial itself to
a mere formality."' Once adversarial proceedings have begun
the "defendant finds himself faced with the prosecutorial forces
of organized society, and immersed in the intricacies of substan-
tive and procedural law."8 0 Moreover "the prosecutor and po-
lice have an affirmative obligation not to act in a manner that
circumvents and thereby dilutes the protection afforded by the
right to counsel.",
15
In addition to such fairness concerns, the Moulton Court
identified a privacy interest created through the right to coun-
sel, apparently seeing this privacy interest as an independent
Sixth Amendment value. With the initiation of formal charges,
the accused possesses "the right to rely on counsel as a 'me-
dium' between him and the State."5 2 Such a view suggests that
the right to this "medium" insulates the accused from certain
State contact, thus creating for him a zone of protected privacy.
Applying this principle to the case at hand, the Moulton Court
found that the State violated Moulton's Sixth Amendment right
"when it arranged to record conversations between Moulton
and its undercover informant, Colson." 5 This "right of the ac-
cused not to be confronted by an agent of the State regarding
matters as to which the right to counsel has attached without
counsel being present ''1u would thus apparently have allowed
Id. at 179.
"Id. at 170 (quoting United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224 (1967)).
'Id. (quoting Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972)).
"' Id. at 171.
"'Id. at 176.
133 Id.
u Id. at 177 n.14.
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Moulton to successfully maintain a § 1983 cause of action
against the State had he made no incriminating statement in his
monitored conversations with Colson or even if he had made
exculpatory statements that induced the State to dismiss the
charges against him.
Moulton's apparent recognition of a right to privacy is doc-
trinally grounded in the right to counsel and not in ordinary
privacy protection enjoyed by all citizens. Indeed, nothing done
by the State in Moulton would constitute a violation of privacy in-
terests protected under the Fourth Amendment.1 35
If a violation of Moulton's Sixth Amendment rights oc-
curred when his protected privacy was violated by employing the
recording devices, a second violation occurred when the in-
criminating statements were used against him at trial in viola-
tion of his independent Sixth Amendment interest in receiving
a fair trial. 6 The question of whether two independent Sixth
Amendment values were violated in Moulton or just one, and if
so which one, is not merely a matter of theoretical interest. The
"' As Uviller stated:
Because infiltration is normally accomplished by procuring the unwitting invitation
or at least the sufferance of the suspect, it has traditionally been treated as a simple case of
consent, obviating any fourth amendment problems. To the claim that the acquiescence
was obtained by the willful concealment of a material fact (the true identity and purpose of
the spy), and hence that fraud cancels apparent consent, the Supreme Court has consis-
tentiy replied that so long as the activity of the spy remains within the scope of the invita-
tion, deception does not detract from effective consent to entry. Thus, while the Court has
taken a highly skeptical view of apparent consent tendered to the badged officer "request-
ing permission" to search, the disguised agent may enter on any ruse, so long as he does
not abuse the hospitality of his duped host.
Uviller, supra note 94, at 1199. See, e.g., United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971)
(finding no Fourth Amendment violation where government informer carrying con-
cealed radio transmitter engaged suspect in conversations overheard by federal nar-
cotics agents); Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966) (finding no Fourth
Amendment violation where federal drug agent posed as a drug buyer to a seller who
invited the undercover agent into the seller's home for a drug transaction); Hoffa v.
United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966) (finding no Fourth Amendment violation where
governmental agent befriended Hoffa in order to investigate Hoffa's criminal activi-
ties and Hoffa made incriminating statements to the agent); Lopez v. United States,
373 U.S. 427 (1963) (finding no violation of Fourth Amendment where person made
unsolicited bribe to IRS agent who feigned participation in scheme and met with the
person and recorded his bribe offers by means of a concealed recorder). None of the
above cases involved warrants tojustify the intrusions.
" See Halpern, supra note 29, at 143.
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question has direct implications on the issue of the appropriate
remedy to be applied when the Sixth Amendment is violated.
If, for example, the violation constitutes merely a violation of
the privacy value, redress could theoretically be made through a
§ 1983 action while permitting the State to use the incriminat-
ing evidence against Moulton at trial,1 assuming the evidence is
otherwise reliable. If only the privacy value is at stake, the situa-
tion is similar to the Fourth Amendment context where exclud-
ing evidence obtained as a consequence of a governmental
violation of privacy is not necessarily constitutionally man-
dated.138 The § 1983 remedy would arguably redress Moulton
and deter future violations of attorney-client privacy by the
State. On the other hand, if the violation offends Moulton's in-
terests in a fair trial, evidence obtained through the violation
could not constitutionally be used against Moulton. Such use
would itself render his trial unfair."9
'" The situation is similar to that of the exclusionary rule in Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence. While the Supreme Court has mandated the exclusionary rule as the
remedy for violations of privacy interests under the Fourth Amendment, see Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), the rule is required as the product of a "cost benefit"
analysis rather than a necessary, constitutionally required, remedy.
[F]reedom from unreasonable searches and seizures is a substantive protection available to
all inhabitants of the United States, whether or not charged with crime. The right thus dif-
fers from protections under most of the fifth amendment... which [refer] to persons
charged with crime or the "accused." ... [Because] the fourth amendment, in language
and origin, is dearly substantive [the] Court was correct in holding the exclusionary rule to
be simply a remedial device designed to make the substantive right more meaningful,
rather than an independent procedural right.
... Procedural rights are supposed to exclude evidence. Substantive rights need not.
Consequently, fourth amendment rights should be deemed different from, but not less
important than, the procedural rights protected by the fifth ... and fourteenth amend-
ments. By way of comparison, first and third amendment rights are substantive, but no-
body would deem them second class.
Whether evidence is unconstitutionally obtained or unconstitutionally used makes a
difference. If the only constitutional wrong inheres in using the evidence, the Court has
no business considering concepts of deterrence. The Court should prohibit use of such
evidence. Conversely, when obtaining evidence is the constitutional wrong, exclusion
should be subjected to a cost/benefit analysis.
Loewy, supra note 41, at 909-11, 939. See also Gardner, The Emerging Good Faith Excep-
tion, supra note 29, at 432-39.
m See the Loewy and Gardner cites, supra note 137.
' See the Loewy quote, supra note 137. For a similar argument in the context of
the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, see generally, Gardner, Sec-
tion 1983 Actions UnderMiranda, supra note 29.
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These doctrinal nuances did not escape the four dissenting
Justices in Moulton. For the dissenters, the police acted in "good
faith" and thus did not violate the Sixth Amendment.140  But
even if, for the sake of argument, Sixth Amendment interests
were at stake in Moulton, the dissenters would permit the evi-
dence obtained to be used against Moulton. Analogizing to
Fourth Amendment privacy violations, the dissenters observed
that the majority had identified the violation of Moulton's pri-
vacy interest as the sole Sixth Amendment value offended in the
case. Therefore, as in the Fourth Amendment, evidence ob-
tained through good faith invasions of privacy need not, indeed
should not, be excluded. While the State may have invaded
Moulton's attorney-client privacy, its good-faith conduct was
permissible, perhaps even praiseworthy, and thus not the kind
of undesirable conduct subject to the deterrent purposes of the
• • .i 141
exclusionary rule.
40 For the dissenters, the police acted in "good faith" in monitoring Moulton's
conversations given the danger posed to Colson and the interest in investigating
Moulton's possible future criminal activity. Thus, even though the State "deliberately
elicited" information from Moulton after he had been indicted, the State's purpose
was not to gather evidence for the crimes for which Moulton was indicted and there-
fore such evidence when received should not be excluded. See Maine v. Moulton, 474
U.S. 159, 184-190 (1985) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
. ChiefJustice Burger, writing for the dissenters, explained:
Even if I were prepared to join the Court in this enlargement of the protection of the
Sixth Amendment, I would have serious doubts about also extending the reach of the ex-
clusionary rule to cover this case. "Cases involving Sixth Amendment deprivations are sub-
ject to the general rule that remedies should be tailored to the injury suffered from the
constitutional violation and should not unnecessarily infringe on competing interests."
Application of the exclusionary rule here makes little sense, as demonstrated by "weighing
the costs and benefits of preventing the use in the prosecution's case-in-chief of inherently
trustworthy tangible evidence."
With respect to the costs, applying the rule to cases where the State deliberately elic-
its statements from a defendant in the course of investigating a separate crime excludes
evidence that is "typically reliable and often the most probative information bearing on the
guilt or innocence of the defendant." Moreover because of the trustworthy nature of the
evidence its admission will not threaten "the fairness of a trial or... the integrity of the
factfinding process."
Against these costs, applying the rule here appears to create precious little in the way
of offsetting "benefits." Like searches in violation of the Fourth Amendment, the "wrong"
that the Court condemns was "fully accomplished" by the elicitation of comments from the
defendant and "the exclusionary rule is neither intended nor able to cure the invasion of
the defendant's rights which he has already suffered."
The application of the exclusionary rule here must therefore be premised on deter-
rence of certain types of conduct by the police. We have explained, however, that "[t~he
deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule necessarily assumes that the police have en-
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A similar analysis of Moulton, also drawing analogies to
Fourth Amendmentjurisprudence, might admit that a violation
of the Sixth Amendment occurred, but require Moulton to pur-
sue a remedy other than the exclusionary rule. If the only in-
terest offended is privacy, there is nothing necessarily
unconstitutional with permitting the fruits of the privacy viola-
tion to be used in evidence and redressing the privacy violation
through civil rights actions against the governmental invaders of
privacy.
4 2
Such interpretations of the role of the exclusionary rule in
Sixth Amendment jurisprudence make sense if the sole value
underlying the right to counsel is the privacy value. To the ex-
tent that Sixth Amendment violations constitute unfair govern-
mental advantage over the accused, however, evidence obtained
through such violations must be excluded lest trial fairness is
compromised.
4. Some Implications of the Sixth Amendment Right to Privacy
Moulton appears to recognize a right to privacy with doc-
trinal underpinnings uniquely grounded in the Sixth Amend-
ment right to counsel. The implications of the Moulton view are
significant and suggest a possible rethinking of the entire line of
"deliberate elicitation" cases. On the Moulton view, the Sixth
Amendment is violated, at least initially, not when the govern-
ment "deliberately elicits" an incriminating statement from an
officially accused person or, for that matter, when the statement
is used against the accused, but when the government seeks the
gaged in willful, or at the very least negligent, conduct which has deprived the defendant
of some right." Here the trial court found that the State obtained statements from re-
spondent "for legitimate purposes not related to the gathering of evidence concerning the
crime for which [respondent] had been indicted." Since the State was not trying to build
its theft case against respondent in obtaining the evidence, excluding the evidence from
the theft trial will not affect police behavior at all. The exclusion of evidence "cannot be
expected, and should not be applied, to deter objectively reasonable law enforcement ac-
tivity." Indeed, as noted above, it is impossible to identify any police "misconduct" to deter
in this case. In fact, if anything, actions by the police of the type at issue here should be
encouraged. The diligent investigation of the police in this case may have saved the lives
of several potential witnesses and certainly led to the prosecution and conviction of re-
spondent for additional serious crimes.
Id. at 190-92 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
"4 See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
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statement by invading the privacy of the accused. Thus in the
Brewer case, had Detective Learning's "Christian Burial Speech"
elicited no response at all from Williams, William's Sixth
Amendment rights would seemingly nevertheless have been vio-
lated. 4 1 Similarly, in Henry, if Henry had remained silent in the
face of the attempts of his fellow inmate's undercover attempts
to gather incriminating information, the accused would appar-
ently have had a cause of action to redress the violation of his
Sixth Amendment rights.'" Governmental attempts to elicit in-
criminating information appear, on this view, to be as inappro-
priate as actual elicitations or even actual use of incriminating
elicitations against an accused.
If this is, indeed, the Court's view, several questions are im-
mediately raised. Why should accused persons like Williams,
Henry, and Moulton be granted privacy protection? It is one
thing to recognize Sixth Amendment privacy rights in order to
promote policies favoring open communication with counsel
when an accused is actually conferring with counsel.'4 The gov-
ernmental invasions of the privacy per se of Williams, Henry,
and Moulton, however, posed no threat to the possibilities of
open communication between those accused persons and their
respective attorneys. If no incriminating information had been
obtained, those accused persons could have met with counsel
and planned strategy, perhaps denying guilt. Even where, as in
the actual Williams, Henry, and Moulton cases, the government
did elicit incriminating evidence, the process of eliciting the
evidence appears to have had little to do with the policies un-
derlying Sixth Amendment privacy protection. The fact that the
government elicited incriminating information surely altered
the nature of the defense theories eventually discussed by Wil-
liams, Henry, and Moulton with their respective lawyers, but the
elicitation of such evidence did not detract from the privacy of
such conferences when they occurred.
Rather than grounding Sixth Amendment privacy in poli-
cies protecting open communication with counsel, perhaps the
- See supra Part III.B.1.
.4 See supra notes 107-18 and accompanying text.
'4' See supra note 42.
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Moulton Court sought to embrace a privacy right to be free from
interrogation, similar to that sometimes alluded to in the
Miranda context of "custodial interrogation" under the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.4  Apart from
the fact that under existing Miranda case law neither Henry nor
Moulton was "interrogated" 147 and Moulton was not in "custody"
at the time the State invaded his privacy, 14 the Court has not
looked favorably upon privacy protection as a value underlying
the Fifth Amendment.149 It is the use of the coerced incriminat-
ing statement that constitutes the Fifth Amendment evil, not the
means employed by government to obtain the statement.
50
Moreover, if, as the Moulton Court suggests, the right to
counsel was violated in Williams, Henry, Moulton, and in Massiah
itself when the government initially approached the accused
persons in those cases prior to any elicitation of information,
the Sixth Amendment evil would appear to be invasion of the
accused person's privacy per se.'5' If so, why does the Court re-
quire the initiation of official adversary proceedings to trigger
the privacy interest? Why does the Court insist on "deliberate"
attempts to elicit information by government as essential to vio-
lations of the Sixth Amendment? Why is there no invasion of
Sixth Amendment privacy in Kuhlmann, the "passive listener"
"6 For a discussion rejecting privacy protection as a possible value underlying
Miranda, see generally Gardner, Section 1983 Actions UnderMiranda, supra note 29.
,'7 See United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 279 (1980) and discussion supra Part
III.B.2; see also Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 176 (1985) and discussion supra Part
III.B.3. See generally Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292 (1990) (Miranda warnings not re-
quired when a suspect is unaware that he is speaking to a law enforcement officer and
gives an incriminating statement).
" See Moulton, 474 U.S. at 165; see generally Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420
(1984).
" 9 See Gardner, Section 1983 Actions UnderMiranda, supra note 29, at 1292-94.
"' See the Loewy quote, supra note 137 and accompanying text.
,' Professor Uviller has argued that the Court's "deliberate elicitation" cases do
not raise Sixth Amendment interests at all and should be dealt with under the privacy
protection apparatus of the Fourth Amendment. Uviller, supra note 94, at 1154-95.
In an early article, Professor Dix wondered whether Massiah created "a general right
of privacy that is violated by any undercover surveillance that occurs after the Massiah
right becomes applicable[.]" George E. Dix, Undercover Investigations and Police Rule-
making, 53 TEx. L. RE v. 203, 227 (1975).
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case? 1, 2 So far as privacy issues per se are concerned, it seems to
make little difference if an undercover inmate invades an ac-
cused's sphere of privacy by engaging in conversations about
the accused's alleged criminal activity, as in Henry, or seeks to
"elicit" nothing but instead annoys the accused by babbling in-
cessantly about issues not related to anyone's criminal activity.
Such considerations suggest that privacy per se is not a pro-
tected interest in the Massiah line of cases. At best the cases im-
ply privacy protection-insulation from government attempts to
gather incriminating information-after an accused has become
the government's official adversary and only then when the
government "deliberately" intrudes. In a rare explanation of
the requirement for "deliberate" action, Justice Blackmun
noted:
Massiah... is expressly designed to counter "deliberat[e]" interference
with an indicted suspect's right to counsel. By focussing on deliberate-
ness, Massiah imposes the exclusionary sanction on that conduct that is
most culpable, most likely to frustrate the purpose of having counsel,
and most susceptible to being checked by a deterrent.153
This view implies that the Court's deliberate elicitation cases
are aimed at deterring governmental violations of some substan-
tive interest offended through the process of attempting to
gather evidence rather than merely protecting rights to proce-
dural fairness by suppressing such evidence once it is obtained.
Such a view gives credence to the idea that the Sixth Amend-
ment embraces a substantive interest in privacy protection as a
value in addition to and independent from the value of proce-
dural fairness.'-
It is perhaps wise, however, to keep in mind that the Court
has never addressed a situation in its deliberate elicitation cases
where the Sixth Amendment claim rested solely on an alleged
violation of protected privacy under the right to counsel. All
the Court's cases finding Sixth Amendment violations in the
Massiah line involve situations where the government not only
512 See United States v. Kuhlman, 477 U.S. 436 (1986) discussed supra notes 119-23
and accompanying text.
"'United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 282 n.6 (1980) (Blackmun,J., dissenting).
5 See supra notes 136-38 and accompanying text.
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attempted to, but actually did, elicit incriminating information
which it subsequently sought to use against the accused. Exclu-
sion of such evidence may thus be done not to deter violations
of privacy, or any other governmental misconduct for that mat-
ter, but instead to assure the fair trial rights of the accused.
5 5
Indeed, some commentators specifically reject the notion that
substantive privacy interests are among the values protected by
the Sixth Amendment.
5 6
It is thus an open question whether the Court would recog-
nize a Sixth Amendment violation in a "pure" privacy case
where, for example, the government unsuccessfully attempted
to elicit incriminating information from an officially charged
' See supra note 137.
"6 Professor Tomkovicz expressed the matter as follows:
[The] substantive sixth amendment protection [of] Massiah [and its progeny] is radically
different than the substance of prospective fourth amendment shelter. The prohibition
against "unreasonable" searches would provide a limited safeguard against the informant sur-
veillance itsef. The Massiah right on the other hand, raises an absolute barrier not to the
surveillance, but to the use of its products at triaL
Tomkovicz, supra note 24, at 36-37. Professor Tomkovicz later observed that "[n]o
violation of the sixth amendment occurs until the fruits of uncounseled elicitation
are used in court." Tomkovicz, supra note 2, at 775.
Professor Loewy sees all Sixth Amendment protections as "procedural" with no
"substantive" component. See Loewy, supra note 41, at 909-11, 939.
Along similar lines, Professor Schulhofer makes the following observations about
Sixth Amendment Massiah claims:
[T]he Massiah "exclusionary rule" ... is not intended to deter any pretrial behavior what-
soever. Rather, Massiah explicitly permits government efforts to obtain information from
an indicted suspect, so long as that information is not used "as evidence against him at this
trial." The failure to exclude evidence, therefore, cannot be considered collateral to some
more fundamental violation. Instead it is the admission at trial that in itself denies the
constitutional right.
Stephen J. Schulhofer, Confessions and the Cour4 79 MICH. L. REV. 865, 889 (1981)
(footnotes omitted).
However, some commentators do maintain that Sixth Amendment violations may
occur even though the government never utilizes the fruits of uncounseled elicita-
tions against the suspect. In discussing Brewer v. Williams, Professor Grano states:
The whole point of Massiah is the prevention of the state from taking advantage of
an uncounseled defendant once sixth amendment rights attach. The Christian burial
speech case was an attempt to take advantage of Williams. The attempt itself is what Mas-
siah prohibits. The attempt itself violates the constitutional mandate that the system pro-
ceed, after some point, only in an accusatorial manner.
Joseph D. Grano, Rhode Island v. Innis: A Need Reconsider the Constitutional Premises
Underlying the Law of Confessions, 17 AM. CRns. L. REv. 1, 35 (1979).
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accused regarding crimes for which he has been charged. The
lower court experience suggests similar uncertainty about the
status of attorney-client privacy as a Sixth Amendment value dis-
tinct from fairness interests. As the next section will illustrate, a
review of that case law does, however, offer promising possibili-
ties for developing a coherent theory of Sixth Amendment pri-
vacy.
IV. LOWER COURT CASES: DEFINING THE ROLE OF SIXTH
AMENDMENT PRIVACY
As the above discussion suggests, the Supreme Court cases
present an ambiguous view of the role of privacy protection as
an independent Sixth Amendment value. Given the Court's
mixed signals, it is not surprising that the lower courts have
struggled with the matter. Indeed, a sharp split among the Fed-
eral Circuit Courts of Appeal as well as between various state
appellate courts suggests that further Supreme Court clarifica-
tion of the role of attorney-client privacy in Sixth Amendment
jurisprudence is in order.
A. UNJUSTIFIED INFILTRATION OF ATTORNEY-CUENT
CONFERENCES
Several cases address situations left open by Weatherford,
where governmental agents purposely and for no good reason
infiltrate the conferences of an officially-accused and his coun-
sel. As discussed herein, some courts find such unjustified in-
trusions to constitute violations of the Sixth Amendment rights
of the accused without any showing of prejudice to the accused.
Such cases can thus be understood as recognizing the invasion
of attorney-client privacy per se as violative of the right to coun-
sel. On the other hand, other courts in similar circumstances
require a showing of prejudice to the accused, thus seemingly
taking the position that attorney-client privacy is not an inde-
pendent Sixth Amendment value and that the presence of un-
fairness is a necessary prerequisite to violations of the right to
counsel.
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1. Governmental Invasions of Attorney-Client Privacy as "Per Se" Sixth
Amendment Violations
Several courts have found that the Sixth Amendment rights
of an accused are violated when government agents without jus-
tification or excuse infiltrate the conferences of the accused and
his counsel even though the accused is not shown to have been
prejudiced by the infiltration. For example, in Schillenger v. Ha-
worth, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals found that an ac-
cused's lights to counsel were violated where a sheriff insisted
that one of his deputies be present during several trial prepara-
tion sessions between the accused and his counsel held in the
trial courtroom. 157 Although the State claimed that the sheriff's
actions were justified by the need to maintain security over the
accused, who was in custody pending his trial, the court found
that the deputy's presence "lacked a legitimate law enforcement
purpose."5 s Moreover, upon learning of the deputy's presence
at the conferences between the accused and his counsel, the
prosecutor inquired of the deputy as to what had transpired at
the conferences. 159 The deputy then informed the prosecutor of
some matters discussed at the conference. 60 While the court
found that the communication of items of the accused's trial
strategy to the prosecution and his subsequent use such infor-
mation at the trial of the accused 61 constituted "some risk of
prejudice" to the accused,1 62 a showing of prejudice was unnec-
essary under the circumstances of the case. Where the prosecu-
" Schillenger v. Haworth, 70 F.3d 1132, 1139 (10th Cir. 1995). The attorney of
the accused paid the deputy overtime wages for his services and claimed to have in-
structed the deputy that he was to consider himself an employee of defense counsel
during defense preparation and to keep confidential any information the deputy dis-
covered during the trial preparation session. Id. at 1134.
" Id. at 1139.
159 Id
'6' Id. at 1135. The prosecutor learned that accused would use the word "cut" rath-
er than "stab" during his testimony before the jury, that practice testimony by the ac-
cused was videotaped and reviewed by defense counsel, and that the accused was in-
structed how to sit in his seat and look at the jury during testimony. Id.
"' Id. The prosecutor when cross-examining the accused commented on the ac-
cused's use of the word "cut." In his closing argument, the prosecutor informed the
jury that the accused was "the only witness that you heard from who had to practice
his presentation to you." Id. at 1136.
12 Id. at 1139, 1142.
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tor "purposely intrudes" into the attorney-client conferences of
his adversary in order to determine the substance of those con-
ferences, a "per se" violation of the Sixth Amendment occurs.6 3
The Schillenger court noted that a per se rule was necessary
in order to "deter this sort of misconduct."'r6 As noted in the
above discussion of Supreme Court case law, a rationale of de-
terring governmental misconduct suggests that substantive in-
terests are at stake which are violated at the time the
government "purposely intrudes" regardless of whether any in-
formation is obtained or used against the accused.1'6 Attorney-
client privacy would thus appear to be the relevant substantive
interest.166 However, the Schillenger court did not specifically des-
ignate attorney-client privacy as the value to be protected from
the kind of "misconduct" exhibited by the State.167 Indeed, to
the extent the court discussed underlying Sixth Amendment
values, it focused on fairness noting that "prejudice in these cir-
cumstances is so likely that case-by-case inquiry into prejudice is
not worth the cost."168 Thus, it is not clear whether Schillengds
per se rule is a recognition of substantive attorney-client privacy
as an independent value or is a prophylactic measure vindicat-
ing procedural fairness values. 169
"'As the Tenth Circuit stated:
Because we believe that a prosecutor's intentional intrusion into the attorneydient
relationship constitutes a direct interference with the Sixth Amendment rights of a defen-
dant, and because a fair adversary proceeding is a fundamental right secured by the Sixth
and Fourteenth Amendments, we believe that absent a countervailing state interest, such
an intrusion must constitute a per se violation of the Sixth Amendment. In other words,
we hold that when the state becomes privy to confidential communications because of its
purposeful intrusion into the attorney-client relationship and lacks a legitimate justifica-




See supra notes 153-54 and accompanying text.
166 Sthillenger, 70 F.3d at 1142.
167 Id.
Id. (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 692 (1984)).
" The Third Circuit has adopted a similar per se rule to that embraced by Schilen-
ger. See United States v. Levy, 577 F.2d 200 (3d Cir. 1978). The court specifically re-
ferred to protecting attorney-client privacy as the basis for its rule. Id. at 208.
However, the court also required that "confidential information be disclosed to the
government," thus calling into question whether a mere invasion by the government
[Vol. 90
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2. "Preudice" as Necessaty for Sixth Amendment Violation
In contrast to the Schillenger court's approach, other courts
take the position that without a showing of actual prejudice to
an accused, his Sixth Amendment rights are not violated merely
through unjustified or unexcused governmental infiltration of
meetings between the accused and his attorney. For example in
United States v. Steele,170 the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals found
that "[e]ven where there is an intentional intrusion by the gov-
ernment into the attorney-client relationship, prejudice to the
defendant must be shown before any remedy is granted.",71  The
Steele case involved a situation where a government informer
made repeated attempts to eavesdrop on conversations with an
accused and his counsel conducted in the jail where the accused
was held awaiting trial.172 While the informer had requested to
be placed in jail with the accused in order to protect his under-
for the purpose of discovering such information would be sufficient to constitute a
Sixth Amendment violation if no information were discovered or disclosed. Id. at
209. The court fashioned its rule and underlying rationale as follows:
Where there is a knowing invasion of the attorney-client relationship and where con-
fidential information is disclosed to the government, we think that there are overwhelming
considerations militating against a standard which tests the sixth amendment violation by
weighing how prejudicial to the defense the disclosure is....
The fundamental justification for the sixth amendment right to counsel is the pre-
sumed inability of a defendant to make informed choices about the preparation and con-
duct of his defense. Free two-way communication between client and attorney is essential
if the professional assistance guaranteed by the sixth amendment is to be meaningful. The
purpose of the attorney-client privilege is inextricably linked to the very integrity and accu-
racy of the fact finding process itself. Even guilty individuals are entitled to be advised of
strategies for their defense. In order for the adversary system to function properly, any ad-
vice received as a result of a defendant's disclosure to counsel must be insulated from the
government. No severe definition of prejudice, such as the fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree evi-
dentiary test in the fourth amendment area, could accommodate the broader sixth
amendment policies. We think that the inquiry into prejudice must stop at the point
where attorney-client confidences are actually disclosed to the government enforcement
agencies responsible for investigating and prosecuting the case. Any other rule would dis-
turb the balance implicit in the adversary system and thus would jeopardize the very proc-
ess by which guilt and innocence are determined in our society.
Id. at 208-09. See also Graddick v. State, 408 So. 2d 533, 541 (Ala. Crim. App. 1981),
cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1106 (1982) (regardless of extent that accused was actually
prejudiced, his Sixth Amendment rights were violated when State investigator, in-
tending to gather evidence against the accused, eavesdropped on discussions of de-
fense strategy between accused and his counsel and investigator transmitted
information by means of a body-mike to listening prosecutors).
'" 727 F.2d 580 (6th Cir. 1984), cerL denied, 467 U.S. 1209 (1984).
171 Id. at 586.
'" Id. at 585.
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cover status, he was not invited to participate in the attorney-
client conversations, as in Weatherford, but on his own initiative,
and for no legitimate reason, intruded into the conversations." "
Nevertheless, the Steele court found that the government had
not intended for the informant to infiltrate the accused's attor-
ney-client conferences and, in any event, the informant had not
divulged any evidence obtained from the conferences.' 7' Absent
a showing of "any prejudice from the alleged invasion of the
defense camp," the court found "no basis for [the] assertion
that [the accused was] denied effective assistance of counsel." 75
By requiring showings of actual prejudice, courts embracing
the Steele approach appear to reject intrusions of attorney-client
privacy as themselves violations of the right to counsel. 76  For
such courts, a showing of unfairness appears to be a necessary
condition for violations of the Sixth Amendment.
173 Id.
174 id.
5 Id. at 587.
176 The First Circuit appears to have adopted a rule similar to Steele requiring a
showing of prejudice as a prerequisite to a Sixth Amendment violation. See United
States v. King, 753 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1985) (finding no Sixth Amendment violation
where state police secretly recorded conversations between an accused and his law-
yers and federal prosecutors had no knowledge of the tape even though FBI agents
did know of the recording after the fact and were privy to its contents). The Second
Circuit appears to agree. See United States v. Dien, 609 F.2d 1038 (2d Cir. 1979)
(where informant, for no legitimate reason, attended meetings between accused and
his counsel, no Sixth Amendment violation occurred where no prejudicial informa-
tion was passed to the government). See also United States v. Ofshe, 817 F.2d 1508
(11th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 963 (1987), (finding no Sixth Amendment vio-
lation because accused was not prejudiced where government placed "body bug" on
accused's attorney and surreptitiously monitored conversation between accused and
the wired attorney); United States v. Sander, 615 F.2d 215 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 835 (1980) (where police officers examined an attorney's confidential file
on an accused's case, no Sixth Amendment violation occurred unless evidence ob-
tained used against the accused); Wiener v. State, 450 A.2d 588 (Md. 1981) (unjusti-
fied infiltration of defense camp by government informer violates Sixth Amendment
rights of accused only if accused was prejudiced by the infiltration); Koester v. Com-
missioner of Public Safety, 438 N.W.2d 725 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (inadvertent video-
taping of conference between accused and his attorney at police station resulted in
no prejudice to accused and therefore did not violate his Sixth Amendment rights).
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3. Defining the Role of Privacy as an Underlying Value
The positions of the Schillenger and'Steele courts suggest con-
siderable disagreement among the lower courts as to whether
unjustified or unexcused governmental intrusions into an ac-
cused's attorney-client conferences constitute violations of the
Sixth Amendment. Compounding the problem, the vast major-
ity of lower court opinions reach their conclusions without spe-
cifically attending to the question of whether protection of
attorney-client privacy is itself a value sufficient to trigger appli-
cation of the Sixth Amendment.
A notable exception is ChiefJudge Posner's opinion for the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. DiDomenico.
1
"
Judge Posner focused on the privacy value in the context of a
hypothetical posed to the government at oral argument.1n In
the eyes of Judge Posner and the DiDomenico court, known pat-
terns of systematic and pervasive intrusions into attorney-client
privacy of accused persons would appear to constitute violations
of the Sixth Amendment even if the intrusions yielded no in-
formation to the government or prejudiced any particular ac-
'7 78 F.3d 294 (7th Cir. 1996), mr denied, 519 U.S. 1006 (1996) (holding that ab-
sent showing of prejudice, defendants were not entitled to evidentiary hearing to de-
termine whether prosecution had bugged defense attorney meeting room atjail).
'
7 8 Posner wrote:
We put to the government at oral argument the following example. The govern-
ment adopts and announces a policy of taping all conversations between criminal defen-
dants and their lawyers. It does not turn the tapes over to the prosecutors. It merely stores
them in the National Archives. The government's lawyer took the position that none of
the defendants could complain about such conduct because none could be harmed by it,
provided the prosecutors never got their hands on the tapes. We are inclined to disagree,
although for a reason that will become apparent shortly we need not attempt to resolve the
issue definitively. The hypothetical practice that we have described would, because of its
pervasiveness and publicity, greatly undermine the freedom of communication between
defendants and their lawyers and with it the efficacy of the right to counsel, because
knowledge that a permanent record was being made of the conversations between the de-
fendants and their lawyers would make the defendants reluctant to make candid disclo-
sures. (Totalitarian-style continuous surveillance must surely be a great inhibitor of
communication.) And yet it would be impossible in any given case to show that the out-
come had been changed by the practice .... At the other extreme are cases of ad hoc gov-
ernmental intrusion into the relation between a criminal defendant and his lawyer, falling
far short of continuous surveillance. In such cases harm to the defense must be shown be-
cause the bare fact of the intrusion does not create a high probability that communication
between lawyer and client or between client and lawyer was disrupted.
Id. at 299-300 (citations omitted).
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cused person's case.'7 So long as the intrusions might reasona-
bly pertain to an accused's situation, the intrusions would vio-
late the right to counsel because they would undermine the
"freedom of communication" between the accused and his at-
torney by creating a chilling effect on candid attomey-client dis-
closures.8 0  On the other hand, "ad hoc governmental
intrusions" into conferences between an accused person and his
counsel would not constitute violations of the right to counsel
because the "bare fact of the intrusion does not create a high
probability that communication between lawyer and client or
between client and lawyer was disrupted.""" Showings of preju-
dice are required in cases of "ad hoc" governmental intrusion.'82
The Posner approach, to its credit, focuses on the value of
free communication between accused persons and their attor-
neys as the sole privacy interest appropriate under the Sixth
Amendment. 1  Moreover, the approach wisely attends to the ef-
171 Id. at 299.
"o Id. The proviso in the text builds on Judge Posner's insight and assumes that
the accused's fears of governmental intrusion into his attorney-client conferences
must be reasonable. Id. Thus, a pattern of intrusions that pose no reasonable risk of
inhibiting the attorney-client communication of a given accused should not consti-
tute a violation of the Sixth Amendmerit rights of that accused. Id. at 300. For ex-
ample, if the police systematically engage in secret monitoring of conferences only in
jailhouses between incarcerated accused persons and their attorneys, accused persons
conferring with counsel in counsel's office, or in other contexts outside the jailhouse,
would lack standing to claim a violation of rights.
"' Id. See also State v. Clark, 570 N.W.2d 195 (N.D. 1997) where the court found
no violation of the Sixth Amendment when ajailer monitored a telephone conversa-
tion between an accused and his counsel in which defense strategy was briefly dis-
cussed. Id. at 200. The trial court had denied the accused's request for sanctions
finding the monitoring to be a "one time action." Id. In affirming the trial court, the
North Dakota Supreme Court also noted the ad hoc nature of the intrusion into at-
torney-client privacy in denying a Sixth Amendment violation:
We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Clark's request
for sanctions. However, we denounce the monitoring of telephone conversations between
incarcerated defendants and their attorneys. Should such activity be shown to be com-
monplace, so as to "evidence a deliberate institutional disregard" of an accused's right to
privately communicate with counsel, "a judicial response to protect the integrity of our sys-
tem," may be required. No evidence this is a commonplace activity in this correction cen-
ter is in this record.
Id. at 200 (citations omitted).82 DiDomenico, 78 F.3d at 300.
"' See infra notes 186, 194, and supra note 80 and accompanying text. See also Gov-
ernment Intrusion Into the Defense Camp, supra note 8, at 1145.
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fect of governmental intrusions on attorney-client communica-
tion rather than attending to the degree of egregiousness of the
government's motives in any given case as a decisive factor in as-
sessing whether Sixth Amendment privacy has been invaded.
Arguably, some courts determine Sixth Amendment violations
in terms of the court's assessment of the "grossness" of the gov-
ernment's motives that trigger intrusions into the attorney-
client relationship of an accused in the particular case at issue.18
Such an approach fails to recognize that some systematic but
"non-egregious" intrusions greatly offend Sixth Amendment
privacy while, on the other hand, some highly "egregious" ad
hoc intrusions do little damage to protected privacy interests.""
Defining Sixth Amendment violations in terms of the motives
behind governmental action, rather than on denials of genuine
Sixth Amendment values, risks punishing the government and
the public (where dismissal of charges against a guilty accused is
the remedy) for no good Sixth Amendment reason.
86
"' Compare, e.g., Morrow v. Superior Court, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 210, 216 (Cal. App.
1995) (court dismissed charges against accused as consequence of violation of ac-
cused's Sixth Amendment rights when prosecutor "shocked" the conscience of the
court by "egregious[ly]" eavesdropping on an attorney-client conference that took
place between accused and his lawyer in the "Temple ofJustice," the courtroom), and
State v. Sugar, 417 A.2d 474, 479-80 (N.J. 1980) (court "outraged" and "dismay[ed]"
at the State's "unconscionable" and "unscrupulous" violation of Sixth Amendment by
secretly taping two jailhouse conferences between an accused and his counsel), with
United States v. King, 753 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1985) ("no egregious conduct" by prosecu-
tion officers where state police secretly taped conferences between accused and his
counsel, thus no Sixth Amendment violation), and United States v. Grow Dog, 399 F.
Supp. 228, 237 (N.D. Iowa 1975), af'd, 532 F.2d 1182 (8th Cir. 1976) (mere presence
of informant during strategy sessions of defense attorneys is not per se violative of
Sixth Amendment absent a "gross intrusion into the attorney-client relationship").
' For example, routine taping of all attorney-client conferences to be stored in
archives and not turned over to prosecutors appears relatively "non-egregious" but
would nevertheless pose substantial risks to relevant Sixth Amendment privacy, while
gross invasions such as those involved in cases like State v. Sugar pose few risks of chill-
ing attorney-client exchanges because of the ad hoc nature of the intrusions. See su-
pra note 184; see also People v. Zapien, 846 P.2d 704 (Cal. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S.
919 (1993) (egregious behavior of prosecutor posed no risk to the privacy interests of
the accused). In Zapien, a prosecutor inadvertently found a tape-recording of defense
counsel's perceptions and strategy notes in a pending death penalty case. Id. at 761.
The prosecutor told his investigator to listen to the tape but the investigator refused
to do so and destroyed the tape. Id.
'" The relevant Sixth Amendment interests at stake when the government intrudes
into attorney-client conferences of accused persons may be stated as follows:
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Judge Posner's approach in DiMonenico, with its distinction
between systematic and ad hoc governmental intrusions, thus
offers a useful vehicle for developing a theory defining the
scope of Sixth Amendment privacy. Because systematic gov-
ernmental intrusion is probably rare, utilization of the Posner
approach means that the scope of protected Sixth Amendment
privacy will be relatively narrow. It is likely the case that the vast
majority of cases of unjustified governmental intrusion into the
attorney-client relationships of accused persons are ad hoc in-
trusions, unknown to the accused or his counsel during their
communications, thus raising questions of Sixth Amendment
fairness but not privacy.
187
By clarifying when Sixth Amendment privacy is at issue and
when it is not, the doctrinal uncertainty rampant in Sixth
Amendment jurisprudence is diminished. While privacy issues
are thus not at stake in most cases, more careful attention can
be paid to the relevant issue of Sixth Amendment fairness. 8 As
an aspect of this attention, courts can fashion rules for structur-
ing the inquiry into whether an accused was prejudiced by a
particular government intrusion by adjusting burdens of per-
suasion. In cases where the effect of the intrusion appears mi-
nor, it may be appropriate to require the accused to show that
the government made unfair use of information obtained from
the intrusion. On the other hand, in cases of substantial gov-
ernmental intrusions into attorney-client relationships of ac-
cused persons which pose substantial risks that the government
has obtained and used against an accused information gleaned
from the intrusions,8 9 the courts should require the government
Intrusions into confidential defense preparations threaten the right to effective assistance
of counsel in two significant ways. First, the government may gain access to defense strat-
egy preparations. Second, fear of government access to confidential communications
tends to discourage frank exchanges between attorney and client and to inhibit the prepa-
ration of group defenses in particular.
Government Intrusions Into the Defense Camp, supra note 8, at 1144.
187 i.
8 Id.
one commentor described these risks as follows:
Judges should recognize that, once an intrusion has occurred, several factors will
tend to encourage the transfer of information from informant to prosecutor. First,
overzealous prosecutors may anticipate judicial amenability to their claims that no infor-
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to show that in fact no such use was made of any such informa-
tion.9 Where the government fails to meet its burden, the
Sixth Amendment rights of the accused are violated, entitling
him to an appropriate remedy.191
Where the government systematically intrudes into the attor-
ney-client conferences of accused persons such persons with
knowledge of the systematic intrusion would seemingly be en-
abled under the Posner/DiMonenico approach to seek remedies
under § 1983 for violation of their civil rights on the theory that
the pervasive risk of governmental invasion of attorney-client
privacy inhibited the free flow of communication between client
and counsel.192 Proving actual inhibition in any given case may
be virtually impossible, however. In light of this fact, it appears
that two approaches are available. Courts could find per se vio-
lations of Sixth Amendment privacy whenever the government
adopts systematic intrusions into attorney-client privacy of ac-
cused persons so long as the particular accused claiming the vio-
lation could show that at the time of the alleged violation he
mation was disclosed and that the government was motivated by a desire to protect an in-
formant's safety. Second, informants often act for reasons that raise doubts about both
their commitment to truthfulness and their respect for defendants' rights. The informant
who is himself under indictment has every reason to expect leniency from the prosecutor
in return for information damaging to other defendants. Thus, there is a powerful temp-
tation for an informant to reveal defense strategy information in devious ways, even in the
face of prosecutorial instructions to the contrary.
Government Intrusions Into the Defense Camp, supra note 8, at 1153 (footnotes omitted).
," One court suggested the following approach:
[T] here are certain circumstances in which the revelation of confidential communications
.. is harmless.... (W]e conclude that in order to make a prima fade showing of preju-
dice the defendant must prove that confidential communications were conveyed as a result
of the presence of a government informant at a defense meeting.... Upon such proof, the
burden shifts to the government to show that there has been and there will be no preju-
dice to the defendants as a result of these communications.
United States v. Mastroianni, 749 F.2d 900, 907-08 (1st Cir. 1984) (citations omitted).
See also Morrow v. Superior Court, 36 Cal. Rtpr. 2d 210, 214 (Cal. App. 1995)
("[W]here the state has engaged in misconduct, the burden falls upon the People to
prove that sanctions are not warranted because the defendant was not prejudiced by
the misconduct and ... that there was no substantial threat of demonstrable preju-
dice.").
'9' The possible remedies would include excluding improperly obtained evidence,
dismissal of charges, and damages and injunctive relief through divil rights actions
under § 1983. See Halpern, supra note 29, at 144-48 for a discussion of the availability
of some of the above remedies for redressing Sixth Amendment violations.
n See supra notes 187-91 and accompanying text.
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knew of the pattern of government intrusions. On the other
hand, courts in systematic intrusion cases could presume a viola-
tion of privacy and place the burden on the government to
prove that attorney-client communication was not inhibited in
the particular case.
Whichever approach is adopted in addressing the difficul-
ties inherent in proving inhibition of attomey-client privacy in
particular cases, attorney-client privacy plays a legitimate role,
albeit a narrow one, as a Sixth Amendment value independent
from the more pervasive interest in procedural fairness. Thus
for example, under the theory developed here, if the govern-
ment secretly and routinely electronically monitored attorney-
client conferences in jailhouses, accused persons engaging in
jailhouse conferences with their attorneys who are aware of the
government's practice at the time of the claimed violation
would be entitled to a remedy under § 1983 whether or not
their particular conferences were actually monitored even if the
charges against them were eventually dismissed for whatever193
reason. By the same token, it would appear that a similar
chilling effect on attorney-client privacy would be likely if the
government systematically injected human undercover infor-
mants into the attorney-client conferences of accused persons.'9
Suppose, for example, that the police behavior in Schilleng
9 5
"13 Because the violation of Sixth Amendment privacy rights is distinct and inde-
pendent from any concern for fairness, an action for remedies should be available
even if the accused person's charges were dismissed at the initiative of the govern-
ment because of exculpatoty evidence illegally obtained through the privacy invasion.
194 Human undercover informants may, however, pose less threat to free commu-
nication between accused persons and their attorneys than use of secret, electronic
surveillance.
One threat to the effective assistance of counsel posed by government interception
of attorney-dient communications lies in the inhibition of free exchanges between defen-
dant and counsel because of the fear of being overheard. However, a fear that some third
party may turn out to be a government agent will inhibit attorney-dient communication to
a lesser degree than the fear that the government is monitoring those communications
through electronic eavesdropping, because the former intrusion may be avoided by ex-
cluding third parties from defense meetings or refraining from divulging defense strategy
when third parties are present at those meetings. Of course, in some circumstances the
ability to exclude third parties from defense meetings may not eliminate the chilling effect
on attorney-client exchanges.
Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 554 n.4 (1977).
'9' Schillenger v. Haworth, 70 F.3d 1132 (10th Cir. 1995)
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was the routine practice whenever an incarcerated accused met
with his counsel outside the jailhouse. Knowledge by the ac-
cused or his counsel that the deputy's forced presence may ac-
tually represent a government informant rather than a security
guard working with the defense would certainly create an at-
mosphere threatening the free exchange of attorney-client in-
formation. Therefore, there appears no reason to limit
violations of Sixth Amendment privacy to systematic govern-
mental intrusions conducted secretly or by means of electronic
eavesdropping.
Systematic intrusions aside, Judge Posner's approach in Di-
Monenico sensibly precludes claims for violation of Sixth
Amendment privacy where the government engages in secret,
ad hoc monitoring of attorney-client conferences. But what
about situations of non-secretive ad hoc monitoring? Suppose
in Schillenge 96 that the accused had claimed that the presence of
the deputy inhibited his willingness to communicate openly
with his lawyer. While it would be virtually impossible to prove
that the hypothetical accused actually was inhibited, his situa-
tion should arguably be treated in the same manner as situa-
tions of systematic secret eavesdropping, given the absence of
any compelling reason for the government to require the dep-
uty to be posted within earshot of the accused and his attor-
ney.19 7 Similarly, if an accused and his counsel were aware that
the government had planted electronic monitoring apparatus
allowing possible access to an attorney-client conference, coun-
sel rights would be offended if attorney-client communication
was inhibited by the governmental action. Thus, some ad hoc
governmental intrusions could constitute invasions of Sixth
Amendment privacy if an accused or his counsel were aware
"' See supra notes 157-69 and accompanying text.
'" The courtroom in Schillenger could have been secured from the outside or the
inmate heavily shackled without necessitating guards inside the room. See supra note
194. Courts should structure remedies for violations of Sixth Amendment privacy
depending on the degree of damage done to attorney-client privacy by the govern-
mental action in the given case. Money damages would appear to be an appropriate
remedy in most cases. See supra note 191. However, in cases where the governmental
action renders the accused's relationship with his counsel totally ineffective, dismissal
of the charges against the accused may be appropriate. Id.
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that their attorney-client privacy had been invaded during at-
torney-client communications.
Finally, in situations where ad hoc violations of attorney-
client privacy by the government do not offend the Sixth
Amendment, statutory sanctions may be available to punish of-
fending government officials. For example, in some jurisdic-
tions criminal charges may be filed against prosecutors and
other government officers for eavesdropping upon conversa-
tions between accused persons and their attorneys even in sin-
gle instance, ad hoc situations.98
B. UNJUSTIFIED ENGAGEMENT OF AN ACCUSED OUTSIDE THE
PRESENCE OF COUNSEL
As noted above, Sixth Amendment privacy interests are
sometimes thought to be at stake in the Massiah line of cases.
This idea is controversial in the contexts of both reported deci-
sions of the Supreme Court and lower court case law. Some
courts appear to recognize violations of the right to counsel
where government agents initiate contacts with accused persons
without counsel present even though no unfairness results from
the encounters. On the other hand, other courts in similar
'8 For example, California has enacted the following statute:
Eavesdropping or recording conversation between prisoner and attorney, religious
advisor, or physician; offenses; exceptions:
(a) Every person who, without permission from all parties to the conversation, eaves-
drops on or records, by means of an electronic device, a conversation, or any portion
thereof, between a person who is in the physical custody of a law enforcement office or
other public officer, or who is on the property of a law enforcement agency or other public
agency, and that person's attorney, religious adviser, or licensed physician, is guilty of a
felony.
(b) Every person who, intentionally and without permission from all parties to the
conversation, nonelectronically eavesdrops upon a conversation, or any portion thereof,
that occurs between a person who is in the physical custody of a law enforcement officer or
other public officer and that person's attorney, religions adviser, or licensed physician, is
guilty of a public offense. This subdivision applies to conversations that occur in a place,
and under circumstances, where there exists a reasonable expectation of privacy, including
a custody holding area, holding area, or anteroom. This subdivision does not apply to
conversations that are inadvertently overheard or that take place in a courtroom or other
room used for adjudicatory proceedings. A person who is convicted of violating this subdi-
vision shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison, or in the county jail for a
term not to exceed one year, or by a fine not to exceed two thousand five hundred dollars
($2,500), or by both that fine and imprisonment.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 636 (West 1999). See also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-227.1 (1999).
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situations require a showing of unfairness as a necessary condi-
tion for a Sixth Amendment violation.
1. Invasion of Pivacy as Sufficient Basis for Violation of Right to Counsel
While reported cases directly holding on the matter appear
rare, several courts strongly imply that government encounters
with officially accused persons without their counsel present
may offend the Sixth Amendment rights of the accused even
though the accused suffers no prejudice or unfairness through
the encounter. For example, in Cinelli v. Rever,9'° the First Cir-
cuit suggested that an accused might be entitled to recover
damages under a § 1983 civil rights action if he could show
"emotional injury" resulting from an interrogation session con-
ducted by police officers even "if there was no prejudice to the
criminal trial."2°°  The accused in Cinelli, who had been ar-
raigned and incarcerated awaiting trial, was told that two police
officers wished to speak with him.2°1 Although he was informed
that he need not speak to the officers and that he was entitled
to have his lawyer present if he decided to speak to them, the
accused elected to speak to the officers without his lawyer.2
The officers knew that the accused possessed the right to coun-
sel during any interrogation but nevertheless proceeded to con-
verse with the accused, telling him that the case against him
looked strong, that no lawyer would be able to help. him, that he
would spend up to a year in jail awaiting trial, that he could re-
ceive a life sentence if convicted, and that he would benefit by
cooperating with the police in identifying other participants in
the crime.20 3 At some point during the conversation, the ac-
cused suggested that his lawyer should be present but the offi-
'" 820 F.2d 474 (1st Cir. 1987).
"
0 Id. at 478.
20' I& at 475.
'The accused read and signed a waiver of counsel form prior to conversing with
the officers. The waiver was invalid, however. Id. at 476 (citing Edwards v. Arizona,
451 U.S. 477 (1981) and Michigan v.Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 (1986)).
"3idI
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cers made no attempt to notify the lawyer. The accused made
no inculpatory disclosure to the officers.20 5
The accused subsequently sought damages under § 1983
based on the conduct of the police in conversing with him out-
side the presence of counsel.2 6 The court said the following re-
garding the § 1983 claim:
At one end, an indictment is not to be dismissed when the sixth
amendment violation does not benefit the prosecution or prejudice the
defense of the criminal action. At the other end, if there was no preju-
dice to the criminal trial, and the defendant, plaintiff in the section 1983
action, suffered no emotional injury because of the officers' improper
behavior, there can be no section 1983 recovery. We leave open the
question of whether severe emotional injury, such as may have resulted
in this case from the egregious misconduct of the officers, is something
that may be remedied in a section 1983 action. See Morrison ... We
need not answer this question as we believe that the record before the
district court did not foreclose a finding... that the interview resulted
in a benefit to the Commonwealth or a detriment to the defendant at
the criminal trial.
20 7
Other courts have been less tentative in recognizing gov-
ernmental attempts to elicit incriminating responses from ac-
cused persons as sufficient in themselves as violations of the
Sixth Amendment. One court expressed the matter as follows:
"[I]f [an accused] can establish that [police officers] purposely
interfered with his right to counsel [by engaging in plea nego-
tiations] he can recover damages under § 1983 without proving






' I& In a later case involving the § 1983 claim in Cineli, the First Circuit denied
the claim of the interrogating officers that they should be granted qualified immunity
from civil suit. Cinelli v. Cuttillo, 896 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1990). The court stated: "We
hold that a reasonable police officer should have known that it would be a violation
of a defendant's constitutional rights to denigrate the role of his lawyer and attempt,
in the lawyer's absence, to coerce a defendant into cooperating with the police." Id.
at 655.
' Chrisco v. Shafran, 507 F. Supp. 1312, 1318 (D. Del. 1981). See also Common-
wealth v. Manning, 367 N.E.2d 635 (Mass. 1977) (holding a violation of Sixth
Amendment occurred requiring dismissal of charges where FBI agents telephoned
accused at his place of employment and attempted to persuade accused to become an
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At least one court has clearly held that certain governmen-
tal intrusions into the attorney-client relationship of an accused
constitute violations of Sixth Amendment fights independent of
any trial unfairness that may or may not flow from the intrusion.
In a case reminiscent of Morrison,2 9 a California Court of Ap-
peals found in Boulas v. Superior Cour2 ° that a prosecutor vio-
lated the Sixth Amendment rights of an accused by inducing
the accused to terminate his relationship with his retained
counsel.211 The prosecutor informed the accused that his attor-
ney was a drug user and that unless the attorney was fired and
another lawyer suitable to the prosecutor was retained, no plea
bargain could be obtained by the accused.2 2 Relying on the
prosecutor's representation, the accused fired his counsel and
attempted to hire a lawyer recommended by the prosecutor.
When that lawyer refused to represent the accused, the accused,
assuming that leniency would be forthcoming, proceeded with-
out a lawyer, provided the prosecution with information regard-
ing cocaine distributors, and pursued a possible plea bargain.1 4
When the prosecution eventually foreclosed a possible bargain,
the accused rehired his original attorney and ultimately sought
a dismissal of the charges claiming the prosecutor's actions vio-
lated his rights to counsel.
21 5
The Boulas court agreed that the case should be dismissed
in order to "discourage [similar] flagrant and shocking miscon-
duct by overzealous government officials in subsequent cases."
216
Even though there was no evidence that the prosecutor ob-
tained any information harmful to the accused, the court found
informer and made disparaging remarks about accused's counsel which had no effect
on the quality of accused's relationship with his counsel).
' See supra notes 30-42 and accompanying text.
2'0 233 Cal. Rptr. 487 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
2" Id. at 494.
212 Id. at 488.
213 Id
2 4 Id. at 489.
S&Id.
2'6 Id. at 490. The Boulas Court distinguished Morrison by noting that in that case
the accused kept her attorney. Id. at 492. Moreover, the court observed that in Monri-
son it was police officers who made the disparaging remarks about the accused's law-
yer while it was the prosecutor himself in Boulas. Id.
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the mere governmental intrusion into the attorney-client rela-
tionship sufficient to violate the accused's right to counsel.217
The court concluded that "as a matter of law [the accused] was
seriously prejudiced as a result of the improper governmental
intrusion into his... Sixth Amendment [rights] ... in that he
lost his attorney of choice."1 s
2. Trial Unfairness as Necessaty for Violation of Right to Counsel
In contrast to the above cases, other courts take the position
that governmental encounters with officially charged persons
without their counsel present provide insufficient grounds for
violations of the Sixth Amendment even where the government
deliberately seeks to elicit incriminating information from the
accused. For example, the Ninth Circuit found no Sixth
Amendment violation in United States v. Glove 19 where FBI
agents interviewed accused persons in the absence of their
counsel. In one situation, the agents promised leniency if the
accused, Glover,2 ° would reveal the location of stolen goods and
testify against a co-defendant. When Glover asked if his attor-
27 id. at 494.
2' Id The court explained:
The prosecution contends that, absent any proof of Boulas' having been harmed,
dismissal of the charges filed against him is an inappropriate sanction for the violation of a
criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment rights.... They assert that mere governmental in-
trusion into the attorney-client relationship does not, in every case, in and of itself, neces-
sarily violate an accused's right to counsel.... The prosecution argues that Boulas cannot
prove prejudice, because he presently has retained a competent attorney to handle his de-
fense and because no information relating to present charges was obtained by the authori-
ties. The prosecution's argument fundamentally misunderstands the scope and breadth of
the state's invasion of Boulas' right to be represented by counsel of choice. Criminal de-
fense lawyers are not fungible. The attorney-client relationship "... . involves not just the
casual assistance of a member of the bar, but an intimate process of consultation and plan-
ning which culminates in a state of trust and confidence between the client and his attor-
ney. This is particularly essential, of course, when the attorney is defending the client's life
or liberty.". . . In order to provide effective assistance of counsel, it is essential that a de-
fendant have full confidence that his attorney is representing the defendant's interests with
all due competence.
Id. at 490-91 (quoting Smith v. Superior Ct., 68 Cal. Rptr. 1 (Cal. App. 1968) (cita-
tions omitted)).
2" 596 F.2d 857 (9th Cir. 1979).
' Although the court never clearly indicated that official adversarial proceedings
had been initiated against Glover, it is assumed that such is the case given the fact
that the court considered the case under the Sixth Amendment. See supra note 4.
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ney should be present, the agents falsely told Glover his attorney
had consented to the interview.22 Soon after the interview be-
gan, Glover's counsel happened by the holding cell where
Glover was being interviewed.2 The attorney immediately ter-
minated the interview.22 Although no evidence resulted from
the interview, Glover was briefly upset with his attorney until she
disabused him of his fear that she had "crossed him."224
In the second case before the Glover court, FBI agents con-
fronted an accused, Welser, immediately after his arraign-
ment.2 5 At this proceeding, the court specifically warned the
agents not to discuss the case with Welser without his attorney
because he was in drug withdrawal and was possibly not compe-
tent to make a voluntary choice to waive counsel and talk to the
FBI. 2 6 Nevertheless, the agents briefly attempted to persuade
Welser to discuss his alleged crime with them outside the pres-
ence of his counsel. As in the situation with Glover, Welser
made no statement to the FBI.m
Glover and Welser both sought to have their indictments
dismissed, claiming the actions of the FBI agents violated their
rights to counsel.2  In denying the Sixth Amendment claims
the court rejected arguments that the intrusions by the FBI were
per se violative of the Sixth Amendment.29 The court specifi-
cally noted that it was not the intention of the FBI to "belittle"
counsel.2" Moreover, in neither case was the confidence of the
accused in his attorney shaken by the actions of the FBI.2'
While the court "did not condone" the FBI behavior in Glover's
case and "deplored" it in Welser's,2 2 there was no evidence that




4 Id. at 862 n.5.
"
5 Id. at 860.
n6 Id.
2" id. at 864.
2'Id at 861, 864.
2 Id. at 861.
"' Id. at 862, 864.
2 Id. at 864.
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either accused suffered any prejudice and thus no basis existed
for a violation of the Sixth Amendment in either case.
The Ninth Circuit subsequently summarized the Glover
holding as requiring some unfair use of evidence obtained by
the government as necessary for Sixth Amendment violations:
From Weatherford and Glover and the cases they interpret, it is apparent
that mere government intrusion into the attorney-client relationship, al-
though not condoned by the court, is not of itself violative of the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel. Rather, the right is only violated when the
intrusion substantially prejudices the defendant. Prejudice can manifest
itself in several ways. It results when evidence gained through the inter-
ference is used against the defendant at trial. It also can result from the
prosecution's use of confidential information pertaining to the defense
plans and strategy, from government influence which destroys the de-
fendant's confidence in his attorney, and from other actions designed to
give the prosecution an unfair advantage at trial. 2s
3. Clarifying the Role of Privacy as an Underlying Value
Similar to the cases dealing with governmental infiltration
of attorney-client conferences, the courts in cases of govern-
mental encounters with accused persons outside the presence of
counsel are divided on whether the privacy invasions inherent
in such encounters are in themselves sufficient to constitute vio-
lations of the right to counsel. The positions of the Cinelli and
Glover"6 courts, for example, appear to be in sharp disagree-
ment. Clarification of the matter is thus clearly in order.
Such clarification can be advanced by again drawing on the
insights of Judge Posner for the DiDomenico Court.2  Sixth
Amendment privacy is relevant only to the extent that the free
exchange of communication between the accused and his at-
torney is threatened. 7 Therefore, although it may be seriously
2" United States v. Irwin, 612 F.2d 1182, 1186-87 (9th Cir. 1980) (footnotes omit-
ted). See also Willis v. Bell, 687 F. Supp. 380 (N.D. M11. 988) (holding the Sixth
Amendment not violated by police questioning of accused outside the presence of
counsel because no results of the confrontation were obtained which could possibly
prejudice accused's fair trial rights).
See supra notes 199-207 and accompanying text.
'z See supra notes 219-33 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 177-82 and accompanying text.
"
7 See supra notes 180-84 and accompanying text.
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debated whether dismissal is the proper remedy to redress the
violation of attorney-client privacy, the decision in the Boulas
casem is clearly correctss9 On the other hand, the intimation in
Cinelli that the rights of the accused in that case might be vio-
lated simply through the officers' interrogation 240 appears un-
sound. The interrogation had no chilling effect on attorney-
client communication and thus, even if the accused suffered
"emotional injury" through the interrogation, no Sixth
Amendment value was offended by the interrogation.24' Con-
trary to the court's views, the officers did not act "egregiously"
for purposes of the Sixth Amendment by interviewing the ac-
cused outside the presence of counsel.242 Finally, the position of
the Glover court appears correct, although there appears little
Sixth Amendment basis for the court to "deplore" the actions of
the police in that case. 243 The court focused on the proper is-
sue, whether the actions of the government detracted from the
ability of Glover and Wesler to work, and freely communicate,
with their attorneys. Finding no threat to the relevant privacy
value and no evidence of infringements of fairness considera-
tions, the Glover court properly denied the Sixth Amendment
claims.
Under this analysis, attempts by the government to cause
the accused to lose confidence in his attorney do not offend the
Sixth Amendment unless the accused is actually induced to lose
confidence in his attorney through the actions of the govern-
ment. However, what if the government inadvertently sours the
attorney-client relationship of an accused and his attorney? On
See supra notes 210-18 and accompanying text.
" The less drastic remedy of damages and injunctive relief through a civil rights
action under § 1983 might sufficiently deter future violations of attorney-client pri-
vacy without denying the public interest in punishing guilty offenders. In Boulas,
there was no evidence that the actions of the prosecutor resulted in any unfairness to
the accused.
'
4 0 See supra notes 199-207 and accompanying text.
24, See supra notes 199-207 and accompanying text.
24 Neither was the interrogation per se "egregious" for purposes of Miranda doc-
trine even though the officers violated Miranda principles by reinitiating interroga-
tion after the accused had asserted his Miranda right to counsel. See supra note 169.
See generally Gardner, Section 1983 Actions Under Miranda, supra note 29.
20 See supra notes 219-33 and accompanying text.
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the one hand, it might be argued that unless the government
intentionally hampers the attorney-client relationship of the ac-
cused, it does not act in bad faith and thus should not be penal-
ized by imposition of a Sixth Amendment remedy.2" On the
other hand, one could maintain that the government should as-
sume the risk of its actions hindering the quality of an accused's
relationship with his attorney whenever it confronts an officially
charged accused outside the presence of his counsel.24 A pref-
erable middle ground would recognize violations of Sixth
Amendment privacy when the government intentionally or neg-
ligently induces deterioration of an accused's relationship with
his lawyer.246  Thus, for example, if interrogating officers say
things that are reasonably likely to induce a lack of confidence
by an accused in his lawyer and if such lack of confidence is ac-
tually induced,2 7 Sixth Amendment privacy is offended. 24s
In cases like Boulas, where the accused fired his lawyer at the
behest of the government, proof of the violation of Sixth
Amendment privacy is an easy matter. In other cases, however,
where attorney-client relationships are not actually terminated,
proof of governmentally induced deterioration of attorney-
client privacy may be extremely difficult. While it is surely de-
batable, placing the burden on the accused to show deteriora-
tion appears necessary in light of the fact that virtually all the
244 See supra notes 140-41 and accompanying text.
2
' Some would argue that the government has no business confronting an accused
in such circumstances. See, e.g., the discussion of Cinelli, supra notes 199-207 and ac-
companying text.
241 Such an approach is similar to the gloss put on the "deliberate elicitation" test
by the Supreme Court in the Heniy case. See supra text accompanying note 114.
247 Courts should structure remedies depending on the magnitude of loss of confi-
dence in counsel caused by the governmental actions. Minor or insubstantial losses
of confidence could be sanctioned by relatively mild money judgments against the
government, while substantial damages could be imposed in cases where the govern-
ment causes significant deterioration of the accused's attorney-client relationship. See
supra note 191. In extreme cases, where the government causes such deterioration of
the accused's attorney-client relationship that a fair determination of his guilt is jeop-
ardized, dismissal of the charges against the accused may be appropriate. Id.
24 Ironically, many governmental attempts to induce lack of confidence by an ac-
cused in his counsel may have the opposite effect. An accused may actually have his
confidence in his lawyer renewed through governmental disparagements of the law-
yer. An accused may assume that the government would not disparage the lawyer un-
less it was fearful of the adversarial prowess of the lawyer.
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iriformation relevant to the issue is in the possession of the ac-
cused and his attorney.249
The privacy interest described herein obtains only in cases
where the accused has an actual relationship with an attorney
and where the relationship with that particular attorney is
harmed by the actions of the government. Thus, an officially
accused offender who has not yet entered into an attorney-
client relationship possesses no Sixth Amendment privacy inter-
ests but only interests in being treated fairly. Moreover, this ex-
plication of Sixth Amendment privacy reveals that, contrary to
the views of some leading commentators, =0 the right to counsel
entails a "substantive" component triggering violations of the
constitutional rights of accused persons in certain circumstances
even if the government never uses the product of the violations
against the accused. 1
C. THE SCOPE OF SIXTH AMENDMENT PRIVACY GENERAL
PRINCIPLES
From the above discussion, it is possible to derive the follow-
ing general principles for assessing the scope of privacy protec-
tion as an independent value in Sixth Amendment
jurisprudence:
219 One could argue that whenever an accused demonstrates that governmental
agents have acted in a disparaging manner towards the accused's attorney in the
presence of the accused, it should be presumed that the governmental action nega-
tively impacts the attorney-client relationship of the accused. Given such a presump-
tion, one then might argue that the burden should shift to the government to prove
that its actions in fact did not cause deterioration of the accused's attorney-client rela-
tionship.
On the other hand, it appears that such a presumption is not well founded in light
of the seeming unlikelihood in most cases that governmental disparagement of op-
posing counsel in fact results in serious deterioration of attorney-client relationships.
See supra note 248. Thus it appears preferable to require the accused to show both
that the government culpably intruded into his attorney-client relationship and that
such intrusion resulted in erosion of that relationship.
" See supra note 156.
23 See supra note 191 and accompanying text. See also the discussion of Boulas, su-
pra notes 210-18 and accompanying text.
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Governmental Intrusions Into Attorney-Client Conferences 2
1) Ad hoc governmental intrusions into the attorney-client
relationship of an accused do not violate Sixth Amendment pri-
vacy if the intrusions were unknown to either the accused or his
counsel at the time of attorney-client communications.
2) Systematic governmental intrusions into attorney-client
relationships of accused persons violate, or presumably violate,
Sixth Amendment privacy if the particular accused claiming a
violation shows that at the time of the alleged violation he was
aware of the pattern of governmental intrusions and that the in-
trusions were of a kind that posed a reasonable risk of inhibiting
communication with his counsel, whether or not the govern-
ment actually intruded into attorney-client conferences of the
accused and his counsel .
3) Any governmental intrusion, either ad hoc or systematic,
into the attorney-client relationship of an accused violates Sixth
Amendment privacy if the particular accused claiming a viola-
tion shows that the intrusion posed a reasonable risk of inhibit-
ing attorney-client communication and did in fact inhibit free
communication between the accused and his counsel.
Governmental Confrontations of Officially Charged Persons Outside the Pres-
ence of Their Attorneys
4) Sixth Amendment privacy is violated only where a gov-
ernmental confrontation of an accused outside the presence of
counsel is intended, or is reasonably likely, to induce deteriora-
tion of an existing attorney-client relationship of an accused and
his counsel and where the confrontation actually induces a de-
terioration of the attorney-client relationship.2
'2 The governmental intrusions into attorney-client conferences described herein
assume that the intrusion is purposeful and is neitherjustifled nor excused.
" The systematic intrusions may take the form of either electronic listening or
human eavesdropping by means of an undercover informant. The monitoring is ei-
ther a violation or a presumptive violation of the Sixth Amendment depending on
whether courts adopt a "per se" or "presumptive" violation approach. See supra notes
180, 191-93 and accompanying text.
24 The position defended here is thus at odds with the Manning case, supra note
208. That case appears inconsistent with Morr-son, which holds that mere disparage-
ment of an accused's attorney by government officials is not sufficient basis for dis-
missing charges against the accused.
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V. RETHINKING THE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
The above principles defining the scope of Sixth Amend-
ment privacy may be usefully applied in rethinking the Supreme
Court's confusing and controversial case law. As the following
discussion will show, some of the Court's cases are correctly de-
cided while most are not, at least to the extent that the cases
rely, implicitly or explicitly, on protection of Sixth Amendment
privacy as their underlying rationale.
The assessment of the Court's output in terms of the prin-
ciples of Sixth Amendment privacy offered by this Article fur-
thers an evaluation of the Court's work that distinguishes the
concerns for privacy and fairness as Sixth Amendment values.
This distinction, in turn, permits a rethinking of the case law in
terms of the underlying value relevant in each particular case.
A. THE SUPREME COURT CASES AND SIXTH AMENDMENT PRIVACY
For purposes of this assessment the cases are usefully di-
vided into three categories: (1) direct governmental infiltration
of an accused's attorney-client relationship (the Weatherford
case); (2) governmental confrontation of an accused outside
the presence of his counsel where no prejudicial information is
obtained (the Morrison case); and (3) governmental confronta-
tions of an accused outside the presence of counsel where
prejudicial information is obtained (the Massiah, "deliberate
elicitation," line of cases).
1. TheWeatherford Case
Weatherford constitutes a situation of ad hoc governmental
infiltration of the accused's attorney-client relationship justified
by the need to protect the safety and undercover identity of the
informant.25 Given that the government obtained no informa-
tion from the infiltration that was used against the accused, the
accused was not unfairly prejudiced by the infiltration. Moreo-
ver, no violation of Sixth Amendment privacy occurred given
When Sixth Amendment privacy is offended under any of the four principles ar-
ticulated in the text, courts should impose remedies appropriate to the degree of the
privacy violation in the instant case. See supra notes 191, 197, and 247.
"' See supra notes 57-75 and accompanying text.
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the ad hoc nature of the intrusion and the fact that attorney-
client communication was not in fact inhibited." Thus, no
relevant Sixth Amendment value was offended in Weather ford
and the Court correctly found no violation of the right to coun-
sel.
Moreover, even if the intrusion in Weatherford had not been
justified, it would not have offended Sixth Amendment privacy
given its ad hoc nature and the fact that attorney-client com-
munication was not in fact inhibited. While the Court might
see punishing the government for bad faith intrusions into the
attorney-client relationship of an accused as a per se protection
of the accused's fairness interests, such intrusions pose no
threat to his interests in attorney-client privacy. 25 In any event,
with privacy concerns filtered out, the Court could focus directly
on the only relevant Sixth Amendment interest, protecting fair-
ness, raised through unjustified or unexcused ad hoc govern-
mental intrusions into the attorney-client relationships of
accused persons.2s
2. TheMorrison Case
Morrison is another situation of an ad hoc confrontation of
an accused by the police, this time while the accused was outside
the presence of her lawyer.2 9 While the police disparaged the
accused's lawyer, their comments had no negative effect on the
quality of the accused's relationship with her attorney. There-
fore, even if the police intended to damage seriously the rela-
tionship of the accused with her lawyer, no issue of Sixth
Amendment privacy was raised 26° and the Court correctly re-
fused to dismiss the indictment against the accused.
26 See Principle (3), supra text accompanying notes 253-54.
" Thus, the Court's reference to Sixth Amendment privacy, supra text accompany-
ing note 80, appears inapposite. See supra notes 177-94 and accompanying text.
' See supra notes 57-78 and accompanying text. The assessment of Weatherford in
this Article suggests that the Court in fact focused on fairness issues in discussing bad
faith governmental intrusions into attorney-client privacy. See supra notes 85-88 and
accompanying text.
"'See supra notes 30-42 and accompanying text.
See Principle (4), supra text accompanying note 254.
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However, the Morrison Court also opined that the Sixth
Amendment had been violated 61 and that the "egregious behav-
ior" of the police "may be remedied in other proceedings,"
262
presumably through a § 1983 action against the police.26 As
discussed above, such a view appears to presume a violation of
Sixth Amendment privacy as the basis for the unconstitutional
police action.6
Under the principles presented in this Article, there was no
violation of the Sixth Amendment in Morrison. Because the ac-
tions of the police did not offend protected attorney-client pri-
vacy and because no unfairness resulted from their actions,
there was no infringement of any value relevant to the Right to
Counsel Clause. Therefore, not only did the police not act un-
constitutionally in Morrison, their actions were not "egregious"
for purposes of the Sixth Amendment.
3. Deliberate Elicitation, Massiah, and its Progeny
In the Massiah line of cases the police gathered incriminat-
ing information from an accused after the initiation of adversar-
ial proceedings against the accused at a time when his lawyer
was not present. As the above discussion suggests, the cases,
with the exception of Wilson,26 could arguably be viewed as
situations where the government breached the Sixth Amend-
ment by invading privacy interests of the various accused per-
sons.26 Under the principles developed in this Article, however,
no invasion of attorney-client privacy occurred in any of the "de-
liberate elicitation" cases.
None of the cases involved situations where the government
induced the accused to lose confidence in his attorney. 67 In-
"' See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
22 See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
"3 A civil rights action under § 1983 appears a viable remedy given that the Court
specifically rejects dismissal and the remedy of excluding illegally obtained evidence
is inapposite given the fact that the police confrontation yielded no information from
the accused.
See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
2" See supra notes 119-23 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 18-28 and accompanying text, and supra Part M.B.
"7 See Principle (4), supra text accompanying note 254.
MARTINR GARDNER
deed, in the Henry case, and perhaps also in Wilson, the accused
apparently had not even entered into an attorney-client rela-
tionship at the time the government confronted the accused.m
In Massiah, Williams, and Moulton, the accused had retained
counsel at the time of the government confrontation 269 but in
none of those cases was the governmental confrontation in-
tended, nor was its likely result, to cause deterioration of the at-
torney-client relationship of the accused and his lawyer. For
example, while in William 0 it was clear that Detective Learning
knew that Williams was represented by counsel at the time
Leaming delivered the "Christian Burial Speech," the speech,
whatever one may think of it, was not aimed at, nor did it have
the effect of, causing Williams to lose faith in his lawyer. Again,
in none of the cases in the Massiah line did the actions of the
government negatively impact existing attorney-client relation-
ships of the various accused persons.
Thus the Moulton Court's recognition of a privacy interest
offended when the government confronted the accused without
the presence of his counsel' is inconsistent with the principles
articulated in this Article. Contrary to the Moulton Court's view,
under these principles Moulton possessed no Sixth Amendment
right per se "not to be confronted by an agent of the State re-
garding matters as to which the right to counsel has attached
without counsel being present" 27 so long as the agent did not
culpably induce Moulton to lose confidence in his attorney.
In the end, if the argument presented herein is correct, to
the extent that Massiah, Williams, Brewer, and Moulton are
grounded on perceived violations of Sixth Amendment privacy,
the cases are incorrectly decided. There remains the possibility,
however, that the cases are proper vindications of Sixth
' In Heny the accused was indicted and subsequently subjected to the jailhouse
informant on November 21, 1972. Counsel was appointed on November 27, 1972.
United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 266 (1980). The Wilson case does not specify
when the accused began a relationship with an attorney.
"9 See Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 202-03 (1964); Brewer v. Williams,
430 U.S. 387, 390-92 (1977); Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 162-63 (1985).
27 See supra Part III.B.1.
See supra notes 133-36 and accompanying text.
Moulton, 474 U.S. at 178 n.14.
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Amendment concerns for maintaining adversarial fairness. The
remainder of this Article will briefly speak to that possibility.
B. THE MASSIAHLINE AND ISSUES OF SIXTH AMENDMENT FAIRNESS
Once the issue of Sixth Amendment privacy is filtered out
of the Court's deliberate elicitation cases, the decisions may be
properly evaluated in terms of the fairness interest, the only re-
maining value that could possibly support Massiah, Williams,
Henry, and Moulton. The scholarly literature addressing this is-
sue is extensive.2s Therefore, the attempt here will be merely to
summarize the positions of some leading commentators.
Defenders of the Massiah doctrine characteristically argue
that if the government is permitted free access to an accused
prior to trial, the right to counsel protections cherished at trial
will be rendered useless because the government will obtain
pretrial admissions from the accused that will make his trial a
mere formality and counsel ineffective2 4 In perhaps the most
elaborate defense of Massiah and its progeny, Professor
Tomkovicz has argued that the Sixth Amendment requires
counsel at "any pretrial adversarial encounter between govern-
ment and accused if the encounter is essentially equivalent to,
and an effective substitute for, a trial encounter at which such
assistance would be required."m That is to say that "if an en-
counter between a defendant and the government adversary at
trial would trigger the right to counsel's equalizing assistance,2 6
the same kind of encounter between adversaries before trial
must trigger an identical constitutional right to assistance."27
Thus, among other things, the "taking of physical evidence"
273 See, e.g., Dix, supra note 151; Grano, supra note 156, at 18-27; Halpern, supra
note 29; Kamisar, supra note 96; Tomkovicz, supra note 2; Tomkovicz, supra note 24;
Uviller, supra note 94.
' See e.g., Welsh S. White, Police Trickery in Inducing Confessions, 127 U. PA. L. REV.
581,602-04 (1979).
' Tomkovicz, supra note 24, at 60.
6 Professor Tomkovicz argues extensively that the right to counsel is necessary to
equalize the contest between the prosecution and the accused. Id. at 39-49.
2 Id. at 60.
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from an accused is a "critical stage" at which counsel must be
present.27
Critics of the Massiah doctrine, on the other hand, see no
Sixth Amendment wrong with the "taking of physical evidence"
from an accused outside the presence of his lawyer. Professor
Uviller, for example, has argued that "the true basis for Massiah
and its brood probably is judicial discomfort with the anoma-
lous inquisitional component in the adversary design."2 The
"inquisitional component," direct ex parte "inquiry of the sus-
pect, or the use against him of his freely tendered response, is
[in the eyes of the Court] somehow shameful, or at least inimi-
cal to our judicial and ethical heritage."2M For Uviller and oth-
ers, however, "at least at a certain level of suspicion, a request
for the suspected person's explanation is morally justified."28'
Such noncoercive requests, characteristically yielding truthful
information 212 are consistent with "fundamental American ideas
ofjustice." 2' 3 Thus, for critics of the Massiah doctrine, "prosecu-
torial access to the mind of the accused sits well with our pres-
ent notions of fairness."2
This Article will make no attempt to analyze the merits of
the debate between Massiah defenders and critics. The point
here is simply to clarify that the focus of the debate should rest
on considerations of Sixth Amendment fairness without cloud-
ing matters with privacy considerations.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article has explored the doctrinal confusion surround-
ing certain aspects of the Right to Counsel Clause of the Sixth
Id. at 60 n.246.




" Professor Tomkovicz admits that such information is generally truthful but ar-
gues that "[t] ruth... is not a sacred, exclusive, and inviolable sixth amendment ob-
jective." Tomkovicz, supra note 24, at 46.
'Uviller, supra note 94, at 1183-84. Presumably Professor Amar, who sees "inno-
cence protection and truth seeking" as the central values underlying the Right to
Counsel Clause, would agree with Professor Uviller. See Amar, supra note 2, at 642,
705.
" Uviller, supra note 94, at 1184.
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Amendment. This confusion is in large part a function of un-
certainty about precisely which values underlie the constitu-
tional text. Particularly problematic is the issue of what role, if
any, attorney-client privacy plays, or should play, in Sixth
Amendmentjurisprudence.
The Article has suggested that the Supreme Court may have
relied on a vague and unarticulated notion of privacy in decid-
ing its cases in the Massiah line. With its review of lower court
cases, the Article has illustrated that uncertainty about the role
of privacy considerations is endemic in Sixth Amendment doc-
trine. Based on insights from Judge Posner, the Article ad-
dressed this uncertainty by developing several basic principles
offered as guidelines for defining the proper scope of Sixth
Amendment privacy. This Article then applied these principles
to the relevant Supreme Court case law to evaluate its opinions
dealing either directly or indirectly with the issue of attorney-
client privacy as a constitutionally protected value. This rethink-
ing of the Court's output illustrated that, to the extent the
Court relied on privacy considerations in its opinions, most of
its cases were improperly decided. By removing privacy consid-
erations from the analysis, the Article argued that the Court's
"deliberate elicitation" cases should be evaluated solely in terms
of the relevant underlying principle of adversarial fairness.
As this Article has shown, privacy protection is a genuine
value underlying the Right to Counsel Clause, albeit one rela-
tively narrow in scope. Because of the confusion in the case law
surrounding the role to be played by attorney-client privacy in
Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, judicial clarification is in or-
der. When that clarification occurs, hopefully the principles
derived in this Article may be useful guides in resolving issues of
Sixth Amendment privacy.
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